@article{Morgan,
abstract = {The notion of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) has played a central role in discussions of first-person thought. It seems like a way of making precise the idea of thinking about oneself ‘as subject'. Asking whether bodily first-person judgments (e.g. ‘My legs are crossed') can be IEM is a way of asking whether one can think about oneself simultaneously as a subject and as a bodily thing. The majority view is that one cannot. I rebut that view, arguing that on all the notions of IEM that have so far been successfully defined, bodily first-person judgments can be IEM.},
author = {Morgan, Daniel},
doi = {10.1080/00455091.2018.1482432},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Morgan - 2018 - Thinking about the body as subject.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0045-5091},
journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
title = {{Thinking about the body as subject}},
url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00455091.2018.1482432}
}

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