Evaluation of On-chip Decoupling Capacitor’s Effect on AES Cryptographic Circuit. Nakai, T., Shiozaki, M., Kubota, T., & Fujino, T.
abstract   bibtex   
Power Analysis (PA) attack and Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA) attack reveal a secret key on cryptographic circuits by measuring power variation and electromagnetic radiation during the cryptographic operations, respectively. Inserting decoupling capacitors reduces a PA leak; however, a resistance against EMA attack is not well-known. We fabricated Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic chips with and without on-chip decoupling capacitors, and evaluated the resistance against PA and EMA attack. This paper presents that the on-chip decoupling capacitors make vulnerable to EMA attack using Hamming-weight model.
@article{nakai_evaluation_nodate,
	title = {Evaluation of {On}-chip {Decoupling} {Capacitor}’s {Effect} on {AES} {Cryptographic} {Circuit}},
	abstract = {Power Analysis (PA) attack and Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA) attack reveal a secret key on cryptographic circuits by measuring power variation and electromagnetic radiation during the cryptographic operations, respectively. Inserting decoupling capacitors reduces a PA leak; however, a resistance against EMA attack is not well-known. We fabricated Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic chips with and without on-chip decoupling capacitors, and evaluated the resistance against PA and EMA attack. This paper presents that the on-chip decoupling capacitors make vulnerable to EMA attack using Hamming-weight model.},
	author = {Nakai, Tsunato and Shiozaki, Mitsuru and Kubota, Takaya and Fujino, Takeshi},
	keywords = {⛔ No DOI found},
	pages = {6}
}
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