Can Ignorance Be an Epistemic Virtue. Nathan, M. J. APhEx, 27:159–175, 2023. doi abstract bibtex Ignorance has traditionally been perceived negatively, as a hurdle. Our knowledge inevitably has gaps and blunders, which are gradually filled in as more is discovered. Over the last few decades, agnotologists and epistemologists of ignorance have challenged this standard story emphasizing that ignorance is not merely the culpable absence of information. Ignorance also has a “virtuous” component, when a specific inquiry ought to be left untouched. Yet, can ignorance become an epistemic virtue in science, a goal in and of itself? This essay shifts the spotlight to a more constructive side of ignorance and its philosophical implications. I begin by distinguishing three kinds of ignorance. Next, I illustrate the claim that ignorance can play a strongly productive role by connecting it to debates over reductionism and the status of black boxes. Finally, I offer some suggestions for incorporating the pursuit of ignorance into our textbooks and other pedagogical tools.
@article{nathan2023,
title = {Can {Ignorance} {Be} an {Epistemic} {Virtue}},
volume = {27},
issn = {2036-9972},
doi = {10.13137/2036-9972/35478},
abstract = {Ignorance has traditionally been perceived negatively, as a hurdle. Our knowledge inevitably has gaps and blunders, which are gradually filled in as more is discovered. Over the last few decades, agnotologists and epistemologists of ignorance have challenged this standard story emphasizing that ignorance is not merely the culpable absence of information. Ignorance also has a “virtuous” component, when a specific inquiry ought to be left untouched. Yet, can ignorance become an epistemic virtue in science, a goal in and of itself? This essay shifts the spotlight to a more constructive side of ignorance and its philosophical implications. I begin by distinguishing three kinds of ignorance. Next, I illustrate the claim that ignorance can play a strongly productive role by connecting it to debates over reductionism and the status of black boxes. Finally, I offer some suggestions for incorporating the pursuit of ignorance into our textbooks and other pedagogical tools.},
language = {English},
journal = {APhEx},
author = {Nathan, Marco J.},
year = {2023},
keywords = {PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
pages = {159--175},
}
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