"B remembers that P from time T". Naylor, A. The Journal of Philosophy, 68(2):29–41, 1971. !["B remembers that P from time T" [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex [first paragraph] Philosophers of memory have often taken remembering that p to be a relational concept, the terms of which are present and previous knowledge. Norman Malcolm and Stanley Munsat, in their accounts of what it is to remember something from one particular time, are no exception. In what follows I shall be concerned to focus attention upon an important element in remembering something from one time rather than from some other, an element that is obscured by accounts such as Malcolm's and Munsat's. And, secondly, I hope to show how this important element can be incorporated in an explication of 'remembers that p from time t' that will avoid a number of counterexamples to which the accounts of Malcolm and Munsat are vulnerable.
@article{Naylor1971,
abstract = {[first paragraph] Philosophers of memory have often taken remembering that p to be a relational concept, the terms of which are present and previous knowledge. Norman Malcolm and Stanley Munsat, in their accounts of what it is to remember something from one particular time, are no exception. In what follows I shall be concerned to focus attention upon an important element in remembering something from one time rather than from some other, an element that is obscured by accounts such as Malcolm's and Munsat's. And, secondly, I hope to show how this important element can be incorporated in an explication of 'remembers that p from time t' that will avoid a number of counterexamples to which the accounts of Malcolm and Munsat are vulnerable.},
author = {Naylor, Andrew},
doi = {10.2307/2025220},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Naylor - 1971 - B remembers that P from time T.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0022362X},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
number = {2},
pages = {29--41},
title = {{"B remembers that P from time T"}},
url = {http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?url{\_}ver=Z39.88-2004{\&}rft{\_}val{\_}fmt={\&}rft.imuse{\_}id=jphil{\_}1971{\_}0068{\_}0002{\_}0029{\_}0041{\&}svc{\_}id=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection},
volume = {68},
year = {1971}
}
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