@article{Naylor2015a,
abstract = {Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference from one's memory that q and a true thought one has that r, its analysis presupposes an adequate account of the (presumably non-inferential) memory that q. Bernecker's account of non-inferentially remembering-that is shown to be inadequate. A remedy lies in strengthening the account by requiring the rememberer to have had prima facie justification to believe that q, any defeaters of which were misleading.},
author = {Naylor, Andrew},
doi = {10.5840/logos-episteme20156214},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Naylor - 2015 - On inferentially remembering that P.pdf:pdf},
issn = {2069-0533},
journal = {Logos {\&} Episteme},
number = {2},
pages = {225--230},
title = {{On inferentially remembering that P}},
url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/memory/: http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?url{\_}ver=Z39.88-2004{\&}rft{\_}val{\_}fmt={\&}rft.imuse{\_}id=logos-episteme{\_}2015{\_}0006{\_}0002{\_}0225{\_}0230{\&}svc{\_}id=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection},
volume = {6},
year = {2015}
}

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