@article{Nelson1963,
abstract = {[first paragraph] A CONSTANTLY recurring question in theory of memory is the question how it is possible to validate memor the object or event remembered is in the past and the remembering of it is in the present.1 We cannot return bodily to the past in order to confirm our memory of it; on the other hand (we want to argue), any present evidence concerning the event depends on our memory. Thus, we are stuck, no matter which way we look, with our present remembering of things and not the things themselves.},
author = {Nelson, John O.},
doi = {10.2307/2183055},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Nelson - 1963 - The validation of memory and our conception of a past.pdf:pdf},
issn = {00318108},
journal = {The Philosophical Review},
number = {1},
pages = {35--47},
title = {{The validation of memory and our conception of a past}},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183055?origin=crossref},
volume = {72},
year = {1963}
}

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