Strategic ignorance of health risk: its causes and policy consequences. NORDSTRÖM, J., THUNSTRÖM, L., VAN ’T VELD, K., SHOGREN, J. F., & EHMKE, M. Behavioural Public Policy, 7(1):83–114, 2023.
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AbstractWe examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to over-engage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it and then measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead motivated by optimal expectations – subjects choose ignorance so that they can downplay the probability of their preferred meal being high-calorie. We discuss how the motivation matters to policy. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effects of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.
@article{nordstrom2023a,
	title = {Strategic ignorance of health risk: its causes and policy consequences},
	volume = {7},
	doi = {10.1017/bpp.2019.52},
	abstract = {AbstractWe examine the causes and policy implications of strategic (willful) ignorance of risk as an excuse to over-engage in risky health behavior. In an experiment on Copenhagen adults, we allow subjects to choose whether to learn the calorie content of a meal before consuming it and then measure their subsequent calorie intake. Consistent with previous studies, we find strong evidence of strategic ignorance: 46\% of subjects choose to ignore calorie information, and these subjects subsequently consume more calories on average than they would have had they been informed. While previous studies have focused on self-control as the motivating factor for strategic ignorance of calorie information, we find that ignorance in our study is instead motivated by optimal expectations – subjects choose ignorance so that they can downplay the probability of their preferred meal being high-calorie. We discuss how the motivation matters to policy. Further, we find that the prevalence of strategic ignorance largely negates the effects of calorie information provision: on average, subjects who have the option to ignore calorie information consume the same number of calories as subjects who are provided no information.},
	number = {1},
	journal = {Behavioural Public Policy},
	author = {NORDSTRÖM, JONAS and THUNSTRÖM, LINDA and VAN ’T VELD, KLAAS and SHOGREN, JASON F. and EHMKE, MARIAH},
	year = {2023},
	pages = {83--114},
}

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