Trust, authority and epistemic responsibility. Origgi, G. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 23(1):35–44, 2008.
Trust, authority and epistemic responsibility [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
In this paper I argue that the epistemology of trust and testimony should take into account the pragmatics of communication in order to gain insight about the responsibilities speakers and hearers share in the epistemic access they gain through communication. Communication is a rich process of information exchange in which epistemic standards are negotiated by interlocutors. I discuss examples which show the contextual adjustment of these standards as the conversation goes on. Our sensitivity to the contextual dimension of epistemic standards make us more responsible communicators.
@article{origgi_trust_2008,
	title = {Trust, authority and epistemic responsibility},
	volume = {23},
	copyright = {Copyright (c)},
	issn = {2171-679X},
	url = {http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/4},
	doi = {10.1387/theoria.4},
	abstract = {In this paper I argue that the epistemology of trust and testimony should take into account the pragmatics of communication in order to gain insight about the responsibilities speakers and hearers share in the epistemic access they gain through communication. Communication is a rich process of information exchange in which epistemic standards are negotiated by interlocutors. I discuss examples which show the contextual adjustment of these standards as the conversation goes on. Our sensitivity to the contextual dimension of epistemic standards make us more responsible communicators.},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2018-02-16},
	journal = {THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science},
	author = {Origgi, Gloria},
	year = {2008},
	keywords = {communication, epistemic responsibility., pragmatics of trust, testimonial knowledge, trust},
	pages = {35--44}
}

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