Oversight as constraint or catalyst ? Explaining agency influence on State policy decision making. Palus, C. K. & Yackee, S. W. The American Review of Public Administration, 43(3):273–291, 2013. ![Oversight as constraint or catalyst ? Explaining agency influence on State policy decision making [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex Do agency officials hold influence over the policy decisions made by state legislators and governors? For years, scholars have asserted the important informational role that bureaucrats play within the U.S. policy-making process. However, we have only limited knowledge of the theoretical mechanisms that may allow for this influence, or ultimately, whether this influence matters to public policy outcomes. We theorize that the political oversight of the bureaucracy by elected officials not only constrains the bureaucracy but also provides a pathway for agency officials to advance their preferences by communicating their policy expertise. We assess this argument with survey data from almost 600 state agency heads, drawn from the 50 states and across all agency types. Using a multilevel model, we find that the “oversight mechanism” is a key driver of agency influence over gubernatorial policy decisions; however, it does a poor job explaining agency policy influence within state legislatures. These results suggest that oversight allows agency leaders greater success in lobbying governors than more diffuse and diverse state legislatures.
@article{palus_oversight_2013,
title = {Oversight as constraint or catalyst ? {Explaining} agency influence on {State} policy decision making},
volume = {43},
issn = {0275-0740},
shorttitle = {Oversight as {Constraint} or {Catalyst}?},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074012443730},
doi = {10.1177/0275074012443730},
abstract = {Do agency officials hold influence over the policy decisions made by state legislators and governors? For years, scholars have asserted the important informational role that bureaucrats play within the U.S. policy-making process. However, we have only limited knowledge of the theoretical mechanisms that may allow for this influence, or ultimately, whether this influence matters to public policy outcomes. We theorize that the political oversight of the bureaucracy by elected officials not only constrains the bureaucracy but also provides a pathway for agency officials to advance their preferences by communicating their policy expertise. We assess this argument with survey data from almost 600 state agency heads, drawn from the 50 states and across all agency types. Using a multilevel model, we find that the “oversight mechanism” is a key driver of agency influence over gubernatorial policy decisions; however, it does a poor job explaining agency policy influence within state legislatures. These results suggest that oversight allows agency leaders greater success in lobbying governors than more diffuse and diverse state legislatures.},
language = {en},
number = {3},
urldate = {2018-11-22},
journal = {The American Review of Public Administration},
author = {Palus, Christine Kelleher and Yackee, Susan Webb},
year = {2013},
pages = {273--291},
}
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