Ignorance: A Philosophical Study. Peels, R. Oxford University Press, New-York (NY), 2023. Pages: 328
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This book rigorously develops a full-blown epistemology of ignorance. It answers questions that are rarely addressed in philosophy; for example, what is ignorance of facts or truths? Is it simply the absence of knowledge, or are things more complex? Can there also be ignorance of entities and ignorance of how to do something? How does ignorance of facts relate to ignorance on some topic, say, quantum mechanics? If one holds a false belief but one also believes one should not hold that belief because it is irrational, does one still count as ignorant? What varieties of ignorance are there? For instance, should we distinguish between disbelief and suspension of judgment and not even being able to grasp a proposition? What is it for groups to be ignorant? And how should we construe degrees of ignorance? This book then shows what difference this epistemology of ignorance makes by applying it to six contemporary debates on sometimes controversial topics in and beyond philosophy: white ignorance, practices of making people ignorant as studied in agnotology, the conditions under which ignorance counts as an excuse, responsibility and particularly culpability for ignorance, educational practices that aim at ignorance, and asserting that one is ignorant. In each case, it turns out that the epistemology of ignorance developed in the first part of the book provides the resources to take the debate important steps further and, in some cases, even to resolve philosophical problems. © Oxford University Press 2023. All rights reserved.
@book{peels_ignorance_2023,
	address = {New-York (NY)},
	title = {Ignorance: {A} {Philosophical} {Study}},
	isbn = {978-0-19-765451-4},
	shorttitle = {Ignorance},
	abstract = {This book rigorously develops a full-blown epistemology of ignorance. It answers questions that are rarely addressed in philosophy; for example, what is ignorance of facts or truths? Is it simply the absence of knowledge, or are things more complex? Can there also be ignorance of entities and ignorance of how to do something? How does ignorance of facts relate to ignorance on some topic, say, quantum mechanics? If one holds a false belief but one also believes one should not hold that belief because it is irrational, does one still count as ignorant? What varieties of ignorance are there? For instance, should we distinguish between disbelief and suspension of judgment and not even being able to grasp a proposition? What is it for groups to be ignorant? And how should we construe degrees of ignorance? This book then shows what difference this epistemology of ignorance makes by applying it to six contemporary debates on sometimes controversial topics in and beyond philosophy: white ignorance, practices of making people ignorant as studied in agnotology, the conditions under which ignorance counts as an excuse, responsibility and particularly culpability for ignorance, educational practices that aim at ignorance, and asserting that one is ignorant. In each case, it turns out that the epistemology of ignorance developed in the first part of the book provides the resources to take the debate important steps further and, in some cases, even to resolve philosophical problems. © Oxford University Press 2023. All rights reserved.},
	language = {English},
	publisher = {Oxford University Press},
	author = {Peels, R.},
	year = {2023},
	doi = {10.1093/oso/9780197654514.001.0001},
	note = {Pages: 328},
	keywords = {PRINTED (DOCUMENT IMPRIMÉ), agnotology, culpable ignorance, epistemology of ignorance, group ignorance, ignorance as an excuse, ignorance in education, nature of ignorance, varieties of ignorance, white ignorance},
}

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