Personal identity, memory, and survival. Penelhum, T. The Journal of Philosophy, 56(22):882–903, 1959.
Personal identity, memory, and survival [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
[first paragraph] I THINK Mr. Shoemaker's main thesis is admirably made out. There are, however, some points on which I should wish to lay a different emphasis from his. I accordingly begin by restating his main arguments in my own words in order to bring out these particular points. I then try to show-not, I think, inconsistently with his main theses-the ways in which the bodily criterion of identity is more fundamental than the memory-criterion. These are more various, I think, than one would realize from his argu- ments, and justify us in offering a fairly confident solution to the puzzle-cases. I then try to apply some of the results of Mr. Shoemaker 's arguments and my own to the ultimate in puzzle-cases, the hypothesis of survival, which I treat in both its possible versions, that of disembodied survival and that of survival in bodily form. One or other of these hypotheses is often in the background of discussions of identity. This part of the paper, besides being tentative and exploratory, is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment even of the problems of identity raised by these hy- potheses, but only a treatment of those aspects of them on which light can be shed by the discussion of the relation between the two criteria.
@article{Penelhum1959,
abstract = {[first paragraph] I THINK Mr. Shoemaker's main thesis is admirably made out. There are, however, some points on which I should wish to lay a different emphasis from his. I accordingly begin by restating his main arguments in my own words in order to bring out these particular points. I then try to show-not, I think, inconsistently with his main theses-the ways in which the bodily criterion of identity is more fundamental than the memory-criterion. These are more various, I think, than one would realize from his argu- ments, and justify us in offering a fairly confident solution to the puzzle-cases. I then try to apply some of the results of Mr. Shoemaker 's arguments and my own to the ultimate in puzzle-cases, the hypothesis of survival, which I treat in both its possible versions, that of disembodied survival and that of survival in bodily form. One or other of these hypotheses is often in the background of discussions of identity. This part of the paper, besides being tentative and exploratory, is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment even of the problems of identity raised by these hy- potheses, but only a treatment of those aspects of them on which light can be shed by the discussion of the relation between the two criteria.},
author = {Penelhum, Terence},
doi = {10.2307/2022318},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Penelhum - 1959 - Personal identity, memory, and survival.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0022362X},
journal = {The Journal of Philosophy},
number = {22},
pages = {882--903},
title = {{Personal identity, memory, and survival}},
url = {http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?url{\_}ver=Z39.88-2004{\&}rft{\_}val{\_}fmt={\&}rft.imuse{\_}id=jphil{\_}1959{\_}0056{\_}0022{\_}0882{\_}0903{\&}svc{\_}id=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection},
volume = {56},
year = {1959}
}

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