@Article{Phillips2007,
  author   = {Webb Phillips and Laurie R Santos},
  journal  = {Cognition},
  title    = {Evidence for kind representations in the absence of language: {E}xperiments with rhesus monkeys ({M}acaca mulatta).},
  year     = {2007},
  number   = {3},
  pages    = {455-63},
  volume   = {102},
  abstract = {How do we come to recognize and represent different kinds of objects
	in the world? Some developmental psychologists have hypothesized
	that learning language plays a crucial role in this capacity. If
	this hypothesis were correct, then non-linguistic animals should
	lack the capacity to represent objects as kinds. Previous research
	with rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) has shown that this species
	can successfully individuate different kinds of objects - monkeys
	who saw one kind of object hidden inside a box searched longer after
	finding a different kind of object. However, in these studies and
	the infant studies on which they were based, the objects to be individuated
	differed both in kind and in properties. Thus, subjects in these
	experiments may not be representing the kinds of objects per se,
	but instead only their immediate perceptual properties. Here, we
	show that rhesus monkeys successfully individuate different kinds
	of objects even when their perceptual properties are held constant.
	Although these data provide the best evidence to date that language
	is not necessary to represent kinds, we discuss our findings in terms
	of possible associative hypotheses as well.},
  doi      = {10.1016/j.cognition.2006.01.009},
  keywords = {16516187},
}

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