Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom. Pigden, C. Episteme, 4(2):219–232, June, 2007. Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Paper doi abstract bibtex Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic “oughts” that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. But the belief-forming strategy of not believing conspiracy theories would be a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation. I discuss several variations of this strategy, interpreting “conspiracy theory” in different ways but conclude that on all these readings, the conventional wisdom is deeply unwise.
@article{pigden_conspiracy_2007,
title = {Conspiracy {Theories} and the {Conventional} {Wisdom}},
volume = {4},
issn = {1750-0117, 1742-3600},
url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/conspiracy-theories-and-the-conventional-wisdom/F493AE4E5065A43AB0420622A9652CCD},
doi = {10.3366/epi.2007.4.2.219},
abstract = {Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic “oughts” that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. But the belief-forming strategy of not believing conspiracy theories would be a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation. I discuss several variations of this strategy, interpreting “conspiracy theory” in different ways but conclude that on all these readings, the conventional wisdom is deeply unwise.},
language = {en},
number = {2},
urldate = {2020-11-18},
journal = {Episteme},
author = {Pigden, Charles},
month = jun,
year = {2007},
note = {Publisher: Cambridge University Press},
pages = {219--232},
}
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