A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation. Piketty, T. & Saez, E. Econometrica, 81(5):1851–1886, 2013.
A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation [link]Link  doi  abstract   bibtex   2 downloads  
This paper derives optimal inheritance tax formulas that capture the key equity efficiency trade-off, are expressed in terms of estimable sufficient statistics, and are ro bust to the underlying structure of preferences. We consider dynamic stochastic models with general and heterogeneous bequest tastes and labor productivities. We limit our selves to simple but realistic linear or two-bracket tax structures to obtain tractable formulas. We show that long-run optimal inheritance tax rates can always be expressed in terms of aggregate earnings and bequest elasticities with respect to tax rates, dis tributional parameters, and social preferences for redistribution. Those results carry over with tractable modifications to (a) the case with social discounting (instead of steady-state welfare maximization), (b) the case with partly accidental bequests, (c) the standard Barro-Becker dynastic model. The optimal tax rate is positive and quantita tively large if the elasticity of bequests to the tax rate is low, bequest concentration is high, and society cares mostly about those receiving little inheritance. We propose a calibration using micro-data for France and the United States. We find that, for real istic parameters, the optimal inheritance tax rate might be as large as 50%-60%— or even higher for top bequests, in line with historical expe
@article{PikettySaez2013,
  title = {A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation},
  author = {Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Econometrica},
  volume = {81},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1851--1886},
  doi = {10.3982/ECTA10712},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.3982/ECTA10712},
  abstract = {This paper derives optimal inheritance tax formulas that capture the key equity efficiency trade-off, are expressed in terms of estimable sufficient statistics, and are ro bust to the underlying structure of preferences. We consider dynamic stochastic models with general and heterogeneous bequest tastes and labor productivities. We limit our selves to simple but realistic linear or two-bracket tax structures to obtain tractable formulas. We show that long-run optimal inheritance tax rates can always be expressed in terms of aggregate earnings and bequest elasticities with respect to tax rates, dis tributional parameters, and social preferences for redistribution. Those results carry over with tractable modifications to (a) the case with social discounting (instead of steady-state welfare maximization), (b) the case with partly accidental bequests, (c) the standard Barro-Becker dynastic model. The optimal tax rate is positive and quantita tively large if the elasticity of bequests to the tax rate is low, bequest concentration is high, and society cares mostly about those receiving little inheritance. We propose a calibration using micro-data for France and the United States. We find that, for real istic parameters, the optimal inheritance tax rate might be as large as 50\%-60\%\textemdash or even higher for top bequests, in line with historical expe},
  isbn = {1468-0262},
  keywords = {Determinants of Wealth and Wealth Inequality,Methods of Estimation of Wealth Inequality,Wealth Taxation}
}

Downloads: 2