@article{polk_lobbying_????,
	title = {Lobbying and the power of multinational firms},
	issn = {0176-2680},
	url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268014000743},
	doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.07.010},
	abstract = {Can multinational firms exert more power than national firms by influencing politics through lobbying? To answer this question, we analyze the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and a firm. We compare the resulting equilibrium regulation levels, outputs and welfare in a game with a multinational firm with those in an otherwise identical game with a national firm. For low transportation costs, output and pollution of a national firm is always as least as high as for a multinational; this changes for high transportation costs and intermediate damage parameters. When there is no lobbying, welfare levels are always higher with multinationals than with national firms. However, the existence of lobbying may reverse this ordering.},
	urldate = {2014-08-08},
	journal = {European Journal of Political Economy},
	author = {Polk, Andreas and Schmutzler, Armin and Müller, Adrian},
	keywords = {Foreign direct investment, interest groups, lobbying, Multinational enterprises, policy formation, Pollution, Regulation},
	file = {ScienceDirect Full Text PDF:files/49593/Polk et al. - Lobbying and the power of multinational firms.pdf:application/pdf;ScienceDirect Snapshot:files/49594/S0176268014000743.html:text/html}
}

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