Rational cognition in OSCAR. Pollock, J. L. 2000. bibtex*:PollockRationalcognitionOSCAR2000
abstract   bibtex   
[...]This paper will focus on anthropomorphic agents. For such agents, it is the individual decisions and conclusions of the agent that we want to be rational. In principle, we could regard an anthropomorphic agent as a special case of a goaloriented agent, where now the goal is to make rational decisions and draw rational conclusions, but it is doubtful that we can produce a metric that measures the degree to which such an agent is successful in achieving these goals. It is important to realize that even if we could construct such a metric it would not provide an analysis of rationality for such an agent, because the metric would have to measure the degree to which the agent’s individual cognitive acts tend to be rational. Thus it must presuppose prior standards of rationality governing individual cognitive acts.[...]
@article{pollock_rational_2000,
	title = {Rational cognition in {OSCAR}},
	abstract = {[...]This paper will focus on anthropomorphic agents. For such agents, it is the individual decisions and conclusions of the agent that we want to be rational. In principle, we could regard an anthropomorphic agent as a special case of a goaloriented agent, where now the goal is to make rational decisions and draw rational conclusions, but it is doubtful that we can produce a metric that measures the degree to which such an agent is successful in achieving these goals. It is important to realize that even if we could construct such a metric it would not provide an analysis of rationality for such an agent, because the metric would have to measure the degree to which the agent’s individual cognitive acts tend to be rational. Thus it must presuppose prior standards of rationality governing individual cognitive acts.[...]},
	author = {Pollock, John L.},
	year = {2000},
	note = {bibtex*:PollockRationalcognitionOSCAR2000},
	keywords = {agente racional, cognição prática, racionalidade},
	pages = {1--20},
}

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