Extended Ignorance. Pritchard, D. In Arfini, S. & Magnani, L., editors, Embodied, Extended, Ignorant Minds: New Studies on the Nature of Not-Knowing, of Synthese Library, pages 59–75. Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2022.
Extended Ignorance [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
According to extended cognition, a subject’s biological cognitive processes can become integrated with features of the subject’s cognitive environment (and thereby “extended”), such as technology. When such extended cognitive processes lead to knowledge, the knowledge that results is extended knowledge. This chapter explores how the phenomenon of extended cognition relates to the epistemology of ignorance. In particular, our concern will be with not only forms of extended cognition that are epistemically problematic (and which one might be expected to have negative epistemic ramifications) but also forms of extended cognition that are generally epistemically sound. As we will see, some prima facie plausible arguments for how extended cognition might lead to ignorance are not compelling on closer inspection. In addition, some other ways in which extended cognition might lead to ignorance depend on the account of ignorance that one endorses, and in particular whether one opts for a normative or nonnormative account of ignorance.
@incollection{pritchard_extended_2022,
	address = {Cham},
	series = {Synthese {Library}},
	title = {Extended {Ignorance}},
	isbn = {978-3-031-01922-7},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_4},
	abstract = {According to extended cognition, a subject’s biological cognitive processes can become integrated with features of the subject’s cognitive environment (and thereby “extended”), such as technology. When such extended cognitive processes lead to knowledge, the knowledge that results is extended knowledge. This chapter explores how the phenomenon of extended cognition relates to the epistemology of ignorance. In particular, our concern will be with not only forms of extended cognition that are epistemically problematic (and which one might be expected to have negative epistemic ramifications) but also forms of extended cognition that are generally epistemically sound. As we will see, some prima facie plausible arguments for how extended cognition might lead to ignorance are not compelling on closer inspection. In addition, some other ways in which extended cognition might lead to ignorance depend on the account of ignorance that one endorses, and in particular whether one opts for a normative or nonnormative account of ignorance.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2023-08-29},
	booktitle = {Embodied, {Extended}, {Ignorant} {Minds}: {New} {Studies} on the {Nature} of {Not}-{Knowing}},
	publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
	author = {Pritchard, Duncan},
	editor = {Arfini, Selene and Magnani, Lorenzo},
	year = {2022},
	doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-01922-7_4},
	keywords = {Epistemology, Extended Cognition, Extended Epistemology, Ignorance, Knowledge, OA, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
	pages = {59--75},
}

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