Ignorance and Normativity. Pritchard, D. Philosophical Topics, 49(2):225–243, 2021. doi abstract bibtex In the contemporary epistemological literature, ignorance is normally understood as the absence of an epistemic standing, usually either knowledge or true belief. It is argued here that this way of thinking about ignorance misses a crucial ingredient, which is the normative aspect of ignorance. In particular, to be ignorant is not merely to lack the target epistemic standing, but also entails that this is an epistemic standing that one ought to have. I explore the motivations for this claim, and show how it can help us make sense of a range of cases concerning ignorance that the conventional, non-normative, accounts of ignorance struggle with. I also use this normative conception of ignorance to help elucidate the specific kind of epistemic standing the lack of which is entailed by ignorance. © 2021 University of Arkansas Press. All rights reserved.
@article{pritchard_ignorance_2021,
title = {Ignorance and {Normativity}},
volume = {49},
issn = {0276-2080},
doi = {10.5840/PHILTOPICS202149223},
abstract = {In the contemporary epistemological literature, ignorance is normally understood as the absence of an epistemic standing, usually either knowledge or true belief. It is argued here that this way of thinking about ignorance misses a crucial ingredient, which is the normative aspect of ignorance. In particular, to be ignorant is not merely to lack the target epistemic standing, but also entails that this is an epistemic standing that one ought to have. I explore the motivations for this claim, and show how it can help us make sense of a range of cases concerning ignorance that the conventional, non-normative, accounts of ignorance struggle with. I also use this normative conception of ignorance to help elucidate the specific kind of epistemic standing the lack of which is entailed by ignorance. © 2021 University of Arkansas Press. All rights reserved.},
language = {English},
number = {2},
journal = {Philosophical Topics},
author = {Pritchard, D.},
year = {2021},
keywords = {Ignorance in history and philosophy of science and technology - general information, PRINTED (Fonds papier)},
pages = {225--243},
}
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