@article{Reck1970,
abstract = {[first paragraph] In his profound and provocative paper, H. D. Lewis distinguishes two senses of self-identity: (1) the immediate consciousness of one's self, and (2) the continuity of the self. Of these two senses, according to Lewis, the first sense, having to do with one's self-awareness, is the primary sense upon which, in the last analysis, continuity of the self j by means of memory is made to depend. In my critical remarks I shall seek to examine Lewis' treatment of the two designated senses of self-identity, and I shall contend that Lewis' theory, based as it is on the alleged immediate consciousness each of us has of his own self, is inadmissible because it is not universally or even normally applicable. Let us turn, then, to a consideration of Lewis' argument with its two senses of self-identity.},
author = {Reck, Andrew J},
doi = {10.5840/swjphil197011/225},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Reck - 1970 - Critical remarks on H. D. Lewis' Self-identity and memory.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0038-481X},
journal = {Southwestern Journal of Philosophy},
number = {1},
pages = {224--229},
title = {{Critical remarks on H. D. Lewis' "Self-identity and memory"}},
url = {http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?url{\_}ver=Z39.88-2004{\&}rft{\_}val{\_}fmt={\&}rft.imuse{\_}id=swjphil{\_}1970{\_}0001{\_}0001{\_}0224{\_}0229{\&}svc{\_}id=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection},
volume = {1},
year = {1970}
}

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