Belief and pluralistic ignorance. Romero, M. A. J. Filosofia Unisinos, 21(3):260–267, November, 2020. Number: 3![Belief and pluralistic ignorance [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions and evidence. Here I apply a basic epistemic approach to belief – believers consider their beliefs to be true –, a basic pragmatic approach to belief – beliefs are useful for believers – and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach – believers consider their believes to be true and such considerations are useful – to pluralistic ignorance phenomena. For that, I take the definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014).Keywords: Truth, pragmatism, epistemic belief, pragmatic belief.
@article{romero_belief_2020,
title = {Belief and pluralistic ignorance},
volume = {21},
copyright = {Copyright (c) 2020},
issn = {1984-8234},
url = {http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2020.213.03},
doi = {10.4013/fsu.2020.213.03},
abstract = {Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions and evidence. Here I apply a basic epistemic approach to belief – believers consider their beliefs to be true –, a basic pragmatic approach to belief – beliefs are useful for believers – and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach – believers consider their believes to be true and such considerations are useful – to pluralistic ignorance phenomena. For that, I take the definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014).Keywords: Truth, pragmatism, epistemic belief, pragmatic belief.},
language = {en},
number = {3},
urldate = {2021-02-23},
journal = {Filosofia Unisinos},
author = {Romero, Marco Antonio Joven},
month = nov,
year = {2020},
note = {Number: 3},
pages = {260--267},
}
Downloads: 0
{"_id":"FJ9wLvWwk9M8ejj5n","bibbaseid":"romero-beliefandpluralisticignorance-2020","author_short":["Romero, M. A. J."],"bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","title":"Belief and pluralistic ignorance","volume":"21","copyright":"Copyright (c) 2020","issn":"1984-8234","url":"http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2020.213.03","doi":"10.4013/fsu.2020.213.03","abstract":"Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions and evidence. Here I apply a basic epistemic approach to belief – believers consider their beliefs to be true –, a basic pragmatic approach to belief – beliefs are useful for believers – and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach – believers consider their believes to be true and such considerations are useful – to pluralistic ignorance phenomena. For that, I take the definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014).Keywords: Truth, pragmatism, epistemic belief, pragmatic belief.","language":"en","number":"3","urldate":"2021-02-23","journal":"Filosofia Unisinos","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Romero"],"firstnames":["Marco","Antonio","Joven"],"suffixes":[]}],"month":"November","year":"2020","note":"Number: 3","pages":"260–267","bibtex":"@article{romero_belief_2020,\n\ttitle = {Belief and pluralistic ignorance},\n\tvolume = {21},\n\tcopyright = {Copyright (c) 2020},\n\tissn = {1984-8234},\n\turl = {http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2020.213.03},\n\tdoi = {10.4013/fsu.2020.213.03},\n\tabstract = {Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions and evidence. Here I apply a basic epistemic approach to belief – believers consider their beliefs to be true –, a basic pragmatic approach to belief – beliefs are useful for believers – and a mixed epistemic-pragmatic approach – believers consider their believes to be true and such considerations are useful – to pluralistic ignorance phenomena. For that, I take the definition given by Bjerring et al. (2014).Keywords: Truth, pragmatism, epistemic belief, pragmatic belief.},\n\tlanguage = {en},\n\tnumber = {3},\n\turldate = {2021-02-23},\n\tjournal = {Filosofia Unisinos},\n\tauthor = {Romero, Marco Antonio Joven},\n\tmonth = nov,\n\tyear = {2020},\n\tnote = {Number: 3},\n\tpages = {260--267},\n}\n\n","author_short":["Romero, M. A. J."],"key":"romero_belief_2020","id":"romero_belief_2020","bibbaseid":"romero-beliefandpluralisticignorance-2020","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/fsu.2020.213.03"},"metadata":{"authorlinks":{}}},"bibtype":"article","biburl":"http://bibbase.org/zotero-group/science_et_ignorance/1340424","dataSources":["zX4acseCDM6D58AW7"],"keywords":[],"search_terms":["belief","pluralistic","ignorance","romero"],"title":"Belief and pluralistic ignorance","year":2020}