Knowledge, perception and memory: Theaetetus 166 B. Rowe, C. J., Welbourne, M., & Williams, C. J. F. The Classical Quarterly, 32(02):304–306, 1982.
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[first paragraph] At Theaetetus 163d-164b Socrates objects to the thesis that knowledge is perception by pointing out that a man who has seen something can still remember it, and so has knowledge of it; but this is impossible, if knowledge is perception, since he is no longer perceiving it.To this Protagoras is made to reply with two sentences at 166b 1–4:
@article{Rowe1982,
abstract = {[first paragraph] At Theaetetus 163d-164b Socrates objects to the thesis that knowledge is perception by pointing out that a man who has seen something can still remember it, and so has knowledge of it; but this is impossible, if knowledge is perception, since he is no longer perceiving it.To this Protagoras is made to reply with two sentences at 166b 1–4:},
author = {Rowe, C. J. and Welbourne, M. and Williams, C. J. F.},
doi = {10.1017/S0009838800026471},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Rowe, Welbourne, Williams - 1982 - Knowledge, perception and memory Theaetetus 166 B.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0009-8388},
journal = {The Classical Quarterly},
number = {02},
pages = {304--306},
title = {{Knowledge, perception and memory: Theaetetus 166 B}},
url = {http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract{\_}S0009838800026471},
volume = {32},
year = {1982}
}
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