@incollection{rudy-hiller_epistemic_2022,
	edition = {Winter 2022},
	title = {The {Epistemic} {Condition} for {Moral} {Responsibility}},
	url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/moral-responsibility-epistemic/},
	abstract = {Philosophers usually acknowledge two individually necessary andjointly sufficient conditions for a person to be morally responsiblefor an action, i.e., susceptible to be praised or blamed for it: acontrol condition (also called freedom condition) and an epistemiccondition (also called knowledge, cognitive, or mental condition). Thefirst condition has to do with whether the agent possessed an adequatedegree of control or freedom in performing the action, whereas thesecond condition is concerned with whether the agent’s epistemicor cognitive state was such that she can properly be held accountablefor the action and its consequences. While the first condition promptsus to ask “was this person acting freely when she didA?”, the second condition prompts us to ask “wasthis person aware of what she was doing (of its consequences,moral significance, etc.)?”[1]},
	urldate = {2024-04-10},
	booktitle = {The {Stanford} {Encyclopedia} of {Philosophy}},
	publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
	author = {Rudy-Hiller, Fernando},
	editor = {Zalta, Edward N. and Nodelman, Uri},
	year = {2022},
	keywords = {belief, ethics of, moral responsibility, skepticism: about moral responsibility},
}

{"_id":"tX9zBXAMRe6kbk48c","bibbaseid":"rudyhiller-theepistemicconditionformoralresponsibility-2022","author_short":["Rudy-Hiller, F."],"bibdata":{"bibtype":"incollection","type":"incollection","edition":"Winter 2022","title":"The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility","url":"https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/moral-responsibility-epistemic/","abstract":"Philosophers usually acknowledge two individually necessary andjointly sufficient conditions for a person to be morally responsiblefor an action, i.e., susceptible to be praised or blamed for it: acontrol condition (also called freedom condition) and an epistemiccondition (also called knowledge, cognitive, or mental condition). Thefirst condition has to do with whether the agent possessed an adequatedegree of control or freedom in performing the action, whereas thesecond condition is concerned with whether the agent’s epistemicor cognitive state was such that she can properly be held accountablefor the action and its consequences. While the first condition promptsus to ask “was this person acting freely when she didA?”, the second condition prompts us to ask “wasthis person aware of what she was doing (of its consequences,moral significance, etc.)?”[1]","urldate":"2024-04-10","booktitle":"The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy","publisher":"Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Rudy-Hiller"],"firstnames":["Fernando"],"suffixes":[]}],"editor":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Zalta"],"firstnames":["Edward","N."],"suffixes":[]},{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Nodelman"],"firstnames":["Uri"],"suffixes":[]}],"year":"2022","keywords":"belief, ethics of, moral responsibility, skepticism: about moral responsibility","bibtex":"@incollection{rudy-hiller_epistemic_2022,\n\tedition = {Winter 2022},\n\ttitle = {The {Epistemic} {Condition} for {Moral} {Responsibility}},\n\turl = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/moral-responsibility-epistemic/},\n\tabstract = {Philosophers usually acknowledge two individually necessary andjointly sufficient conditions for a person to be morally responsiblefor an action, i.e., susceptible to be praised or blamed for it: acontrol condition (also called freedom condition) and an epistemiccondition (also called knowledge, cognitive, or mental condition). Thefirst condition has to do with whether the agent possessed an adequatedegree of control or freedom in performing the action, whereas thesecond condition is concerned with whether the agent’s epistemicor cognitive state was such that she can properly be held accountablefor the action and its consequences. While the first condition promptsus to ask “was this person acting freely when she didA?”, the second condition prompts us to ask “wasthis person aware of what she was doing (of its consequences,moral significance, etc.)?”[1]},\n\turldate = {2024-04-10},\n\tbooktitle = {The {Stanford} {Encyclopedia} of {Philosophy}},\n\tpublisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},\n\tauthor = {Rudy-Hiller, Fernando},\n\teditor = {Zalta, Edward N. and Nodelman, Uri},\n\tyear = {2022},\n\tkeywords = {belief, ethics of, moral responsibility, skepticism: about moral responsibility},\n}\n\n\n\n","author_short":["Rudy-Hiller, F."],"editor_short":["Zalta, E. N.","Nodelman, U."],"key":"rudy-hiller_epistemic_2022","id":"rudy-hiller_epistemic_2022","bibbaseid":"rudyhiller-theepistemicconditionformoralresponsibility-2022","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/moral-responsibility-epistemic/"},"keyword":["belief","ethics of","moral responsibility","skepticism: about moral responsibility"],"metadata":{"authorlinks":{}}},"bibtype":"incollection","biburl":"http://bibbase.org/zotero-group/science_et_ignorance/1340424","dataSources":["zX4acseCDM6D58AW7"],"keywords":["belief","ethics of","moral responsibility","skepticism: about moral responsibility"],"search_terms":["epistemic","condition","moral","responsibility","rudy-hiller"],"title":"The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility","year":2022}