Dynamical Systems Theory and Explanatory Indispensability. Saatsi, J. Philosophy of Science, 84(5):892–904, December, 2017.
Dynamical Systems Theory and Explanatory Indispensability [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
I examine explanations' realist commitments in relation to dynamical systems theory. First I rebut an 'explanatory indispensability argument' for mathematical realism from the explanatory power of phase spaces. Then I critically consider a possible way of strengthening the indispensability argument by reference to attractors in dynamical systems theory. The take-home message is that understanding of the modal character of explanations (in dynamical systems theory) can undermine Platonist arguments from explanatory indispensability.
@article{saatsi_dynamical_2017,
	title = {Dynamical {Systems} {Theory} and {Explanatory} {Indispensability}},
	volume = {84},
	issn = {00318248},
	url = {http://0-search.ebscohost.com.wncln.wncln.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hus&AN=126784769&site=ehost-live},
	doi = {10.1086/693965},
	abstract = {I examine explanations' realist commitments in relation to dynamical systems theory. First I rebut an 'explanatory indispensability argument' for mathematical realism from the explanatory power of phase spaces. Then I critically consider a possible way of strengthening the indispensability argument by reference to attractors in dynamical systems theory. The take-home message is that understanding of the modal character of explanations (in dynamical systems theory) can undermine Platonist arguments from explanatory indispensability.},
	number = {5},
	urldate = {2020-01-17},
	journal = {Philosophy of Science},
	author = {Saatsi, Juha},
	month = dec,
	year = {2017},
	keywords = {Philosophers, Philosophy of mathematics, Philosophy of science, Platonists, Scientists' attitudes},
	pages = {892--904}
}

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