The Paradox of Governing by Legislating. Sartori, G. In Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, of International Economic Association Series, pages 161–172. Palgrave Macmillan UK, London, 1994.
The Paradox of Governing by Legislating [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
I was saying that the problems of presidentialism are not in the executive arena but in the legislative arena. Thus far, therefore, I have answered only the easy part of the question, How strong should an intermittent president be allowed to be? Its difficult part begins with asking, How can his governing avoid parliamentary obstructionism? More exactly put, How much legislative power does a president need in order to have his legislation passed by parliament?
@incollection{sartori_paradox_1994,
	address = {London},
	series = {International {Economic} {Association} {Series}},
	title = {The {Paradox} of {Governing} by {Legislating}},
	isbn = {978-1-349-22861-4},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22861-4_10},
	abstract = {I was saying that the problems of presidentialism are not in the executive arena but in the legislative arena. Thus far, therefore, I have answered only the easy part of the question, How strong should an intermittent president be allowed to be? Its difficult part begins with asking, How can his governing avoid parliamentary obstructionism? More exactly put, How much legislative power does a president need in order to have his legislation passed by parliament?},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2021-12-30},
	booktitle = {Comparative {Constitutional} {Engineering}: {An} {Inquiry} into {Structures}, {Incentives} and {Outcomes}},
	publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan UK},
	author = {Sartori, Giovanni},
	editor = {Sartori, Giovanni},
	year = {1994},
	doi = {10.1007/978-1-349-22861-4_10},
	keywords = {American President, Emergency Power, Parliamentary Committee, Parliamentary Government, Veto Power},
	pages = {161--172},
}

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