@article{Schroer2008,
abstract = {According to memory foundationalism, seeming to remember that P is prima facie justification for believing that P. There is a common objection to this theory: If I previously believed that P carelessly (i.e. without justification) and later seem to remember that P, then (according to memory foundationalism) I have somehow acquired justification for a previously unjustified belief. In this paper, I explore this objection. I begin by distin- guishing between two versions of it: One where I seem to remember that P while also seeming to remember being careless in my original believing that P and the other where I seem to remember that P while not seeming to remember my past carelessness. I argue that the former case is the real challenge for memory foundationalism. After establishing the case of unforgotten carelessness as objection to memory foundationalism, I recast memory foundationalism in way that allows it to escape this objection. 1.},
author = {Schroer, Robert},
doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00310.x},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Schroer - 2008 - Memory foundationalism and the problem of unforgotten carelessness.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {1468-0114},
issn = {0279-0750},
journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
number = {1},
pages = {74--85},
title = {{Memory foundationalism and the problem of unforgotten carelessness}},
url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00310.x},
volume = {89},
year = {2008}
}

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