Grammaticality judgements and linguistic methodology. Schütze, C. Master's thesis, Department of Linguistics, University of Toronto, September, 1991.
abstract   bibtex   

My goal is to argue that the absence of a methodology of grammaticality judgements in linguistics constitutes a serious obstacle to meaningful research, and to begin to propose a suitable remedy. Since at least the beginning of the generative paradigm in linguistics, judgements of the grammaticality / acceptability of sentences have been the major source of evidence in constructing grammars, leading some to suggest that theoretical linguists are in fact constructing grammars of linguistic intuitions, which need not be identical with the competence underlying production or comprehension. Also, in this pseudo-experimental procedure of judgement elicitation, there is typically no attempt to impose any of the standard experimental control techniques, and often the only subject is the theorist himself or herself. We provide a survey of how grammaticality judgements are currently used in theoretical syntax, and argue that such uses, in combination with the problems of intuition and experimental design, demand a careful examination of judgements, not as pure sources of data, but as instances of metalinguistic.

Several important issues arise when this view of grammaticality judgements is taken, including what tasks one can use to elicit them, how people might go about giving them, and what they might tell us about linguistic competence. Our central hypothesis is that grammaticality judgements result from interactions between primary language faculties of the mind and general cognitive properties, and crucially do not involve special components dedicated to linguistic intuition. We review the psycholinguistic research that has examined ways in which the judgement process can vary with differences between subjects and with experimental manipulations. Parallels with other cognitive behaviours that our hypothesis predicts are pointed out. We then integrate the substantive and methodological findings in the form of a model of linguistic knowledge that reflects what is known about linguistic intuitions, and a proposed methodology for collecting grammaticality judgements while avoiding the pitfalls of previous work and taking account of the conditions that have been shown to influence them. Finally, we discuss how mainstream linguistic theory might be affected by the growing body of research in this area.

@MastersThesis{	  schutze2,
  author	= {Carson Schütze},
  title		= {Grammaticality judgements and linguistic methodology},
  school	= {Department of Linguistics, University of Toronto},
  month		= {September},
  year		= {1991},
  abstract	= {<P> My goal is to argue that the absence of a methodology
		  of grammaticality judgements in linguistics constitutes a
		  serious obstacle to meaningful research, and to begin to
		  propose a suitable remedy. Since at least the beginning of
		  the generative paradigm in linguistics, judgements of the
		  grammaticality&nbsp;/ acceptability of sentences have been
		  the major source of evidence in constructing grammars,
		  leading some to suggest that theoretical linguists are in
		  fact constructing grammars of linguistic intuitions, which
		  need not be identical with the competence underlying
		  production or comprehension. Also, in this
		  pseudo-experimental procedure of judgement elicitation,
		  there is typically no attempt to impose any of the standard
		  experimental control techniques, and often the only subject
		  is the theorist himself or herself. We provide a survey of
		  how grammaticality judgements are currently used in
		  theoretical syntax, and argue that such uses, in
		  combination with the problems of intuition and experimental
		  design, demand a careful examination of judgements, not as
		  pure sources of data, but as instances of
		  metalinguistic.</p> <P>Several important issues arise when
		  this view of grammaticality judgements is taken, including
		  what tasks one can use to elicit them, how people might go
		  about giving them, and what they might tell us about
		  linguistic competence. Our central hypothesis is that
		  grammaticality judgements result from interactions between
		  primary language faculties of the mind and general
		  cognitive properties, and crucially do not involve special
		  components dedicated to linguistic intuition. We review the
		  psycholinguistic research that has examined ways in which
		  the judgement process can vary with differences between
		  subjects and with experimental manipulations. Parallels
		  with other cognitive behaviours that our hypothesis
		  predicts are pointed out. We then integrate the substantive
		  and methodological findings in the form of a model of
		  linguistic knowledge that reflects what is known about
		  linguistic intuitions, and a proposed methodology for
		  collecting grammaticality judgements while avoiding the
		  pitfalls of previous work and taking account of the
		  conditions that have been shown to influence them. Finally,
		  we discuss how mainstream linguistic theory might be
		  affected by the growing body of research in this area.</p>},
  download	= {http://ftp.cs.toronto.edu/pub/gh/Schutze-MA-1991.pdf}
}

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