Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief. Senor, T. D. Synthese, 94(3):453–476, 1993. ![Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epistemic status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete.
@article{Senor1993,
abstract = {In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epistemic status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete.},
author = {Senor, Thomas D.},
doi = {10.1007/BF01064489},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Senor - 1993 - Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0039-7857},
journal = {Synthese},
number = {3},
pages = {453--476},
title = {{Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief}},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF01064489},
volume = {94},
year = {1993}
}
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