Preservation and generation. Senor, T. D. In Bernecker, S. & Michaelian, K., editors, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, pages 323–334. Routledge, New York, 2017. abstract bibtex [first paragraph] Preservationism is the thesis that, generally speaking, a memory belief's justification is a function of the epistemic status it had when it was initially formed. Closely related to preservationism is the claim that memory is not an epistemically generative process. In this chapter, I shall argue for preservationism and for the view that memory is not typically epistemically generative. I begin by considering the nature of epistemic generation and its relation to memory, and proceed to argue that preservationism is supported by these theoretical considerations. While our discussion will reveal that memory can be generative both doxastically and epistemically, it is nevertheless primarily best conceived as an epistemically preservative psychological process.
@incollection{Senor2017,
abstract = {[first paragraph] Preservationism is the thesis that, generally speaking, a memory belief's justification is a function of the epistemic status it had when it was initially formed. Closely related to preservationism is the claim that memory is not an epistemically generative process. In this chapter, I shall argue for preservationism and for the view that memory is not typically epistemically generative. I begin by considering the nature of epistemic generation and its relation to memory, and proceed to argue that preservationism is supported by these theoretical considerations. While our discussion will reveal that memory can be generative both doxastically and epistemically, it is nevertheless primarily best conceived as an epistemically preservative psychological process.},
address = {New York},
author = {Senor, Thomas D.},
booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Senor - 2017 - Preservation and generation.pdf:pdf},
pages = {323--334},
publisher = {Routledge},
title = {{Preservation and generation}},
year = {2017}
}
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