From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types. Serjantov, A., Dingledine, R., & Syverson, P. October 2002. ![From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex The literature contains a variety of different mixes, some of which have been used in deployed anonymity systems. We explore their anonymity and message delay properties, and show how to mount active attacks against them by altering the traffic between the mixes. We show that if certain mixes are used, such attacks cannot destroy the anonymity of a particular message completely. We work out the cost of these attacks in terms of the number of messages the attacker must insert into the network and the time he must spend. We discuss advantages and disadvantages of these mixes and the settings in which their use is appropriate. Finally, we look at dummy traffic and SG mixes as other promising ways of protecting against the attacks, point out potential weaknesses in existing designs, and suggest improvements.
@conference {trickle02,
title = {From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types},
booktitle = {Proceedings of Information Hiding Workshop (IH 2002)},
year = {2002},
month = {October},
publisher = {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2578},
organization = {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2578},
abstract = {The literature contains a variety of different mixes, some of which have been used in deployed anonymity systems. We explore their anonymity and message delay properties, and show how to mount active attacks against them by altering the traffic between the mixes. We show that if certain mixes are used, such attacks cannot destroy the anonymity of a particular message completely. We work out the cost of these attacks in terms of the number of messages the attacker must insert into the network and the time he must spend. We discuss advantages and disadvantages of these mixes and the settings in which their use is appropriate. Finally, we look at dummy traffic and SG mixes as other promising ways of protecting against the attacks, point out potential weaknesses in existing designs, and suggest improvements.},
keywords = {anonymity, attack},
isbn = {978-3-540-00421-9},
doi = {10.1007/3-540-36415-3},
url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/um0kf3dp88b0eg5v/},
author = {Andrei Serjantov and Roger Dingledine and Paul Syverson},
editor = {Fabien Petitcolas}
}
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