Recent Changes in the Concept of Matter: How Does 'Elementary Particle' Mean?. Shrader-Frechette, K. S. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1980:302--316, January, 1980. ArticleType: research-article / Issue Title: Volume One: Contributed Papers / Full publication date: 1980 / Copyright © 1980 Philosophy of Science Association
Recent Changes in the Concept of Matter: How Does 'Elementary Particle' Mean? [link]Paper  abstract   bibtex   
In this paper the author analyzes the recent history of the concept of matter by examining two criteria, in-principle-observability and noncompositeness, for use of the term 'elementary particle'. Arguing that how these criteria are employed sheds light on a change in what matter means, the author draws three conclusions. (1) Since the seventeenth century, in-principle-observability has undergone a progressive devaluation, if not abandonment, in favor of the criterion of theoretical simplicity. As a consequence, (2) the concept of matter has undergone a "third phase" of dematerialization. (This is an extension of the view of Russ Hanson, who described two such phases.) Finally, (3) the current concept of matter reveals a dilemma: if alleged elementary particles are verified through observation, they are composite and hence not elementary; if they are elementary, they are in-principle-unobservable.
@article{shrader-frechette_recent_1980,
	title = {Recent {Changes} in the {Concept} of {Matter}: {How} {Does} '{Elementary} {Particle}' {Mean}?},
	volume = {1980},
	issn = {02708647},
	url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/192574},
	abstract = {In this paper the author analyzes the recent history of the concept of matter by examining two criteria, in-principle-observability and noncompositeness, for use of the term 'elementary particle'. Arguing that how these criteria are employed sheds light on a change in what matter means, the author draws three conclusions. (1) Since the seventeenth century, in-principle-observability has undergone a progressive devaluation, if not abandonment, in favor of the criterion of theoretical simplicity. As a consequence, (2) the concept of matter has undergone a "third phase" of dematerialization. (This is an extension of the view of Russ Hanson, who described two such phases.) Finally, (3) the current concept of matter reveals a dilemma: if alleged elementary particles are verified through observation, they are composite and hence not elementary; if they are elementary, they are in-principle-unobservable.},
	journal = {PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association},
	author = {Shrader-Frechette, K. S.},
	month = jan,
	year = {1980},
	note = {ArticleType: research-article / Issue Title: Volume One: Contributed Papers / Full publication date: 1980 / Copyright © 1980 Philosophy of Science Association},
	pages = {302--316}
}

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