Moral disagreement and non-moral ignorance. Smyth, N. Synthese, 2019. doi abstract bibtex The existence of deep and persistent moral disagreement poses a problem for a defender of moral knowledge. It seems particularly clear that a philosopher who thinks that we know a great many moral truths should explain how human populations have failed to converge on those truths. In this paper, I do two things. First, I show that the problem is more difficult than it is often taken to be, and second, I criticize a popular response, which involves claiming that many false moral beliefs are the product of nonmoral ignorance. © 2019, Springer Nature B.V.
@article{smyth_moral_2019,
title = {Moral disagreement and non-moral ignorance},
doi = {10.1007/s11229-019-02084-1},
abstract = {The existence of deep and persistent moral disagreement poses a problem for a defender of moral knowledge. It seems particularly clear that a philosopher who thinks that we know a great many moral truths should explain how human populations have failed to converge on those truths. In this paper, I do two things. First, I show that the problem is more difficult than it is often taken to be, and second, I criticize a popular response, which involves claiming that many false moral beliefs are the product of nonmoral ignorance. © 2019, Springer Nature B.V.},
journal = {Synthese},
author = {Smyth, N.},
year = {2019},
keywords = {Meta-ethics, Moral disagreement, Moral psychology},
}
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