Trust and political ignorance. Somin, I. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, 54:153–169, 2020. doi abstract bibtex We often hear claims that there is too much political distrust—so much so that society has become deeply divided and democracy itself may be imperiled as a result. At the same time, many also argue that citizens are too ready to believe “fake news,” conspiracy theories, and other dubious material on political issues, thereby also potentially threatening the viability of democracy. These complaints are in some tension with each other. How can people be both lacking in trust, and highly gullible at the same time? But the tension is more apparent than real. The two problems are rooted in common dynamics of political ignorance and irrationality. Part I outlines the basic logic of rational political ignorance, and the related phenomenon of “rational irrationality”—biased evaluation of evidence. Part II applies this logic to current concerns about “fake news” and distrust of experts. In Part III, I explain why some substantial degree of deference to experts is desirable, and probably unavoidable. The key question is whether people can find the right information sources to trust. A number of strategies can help address this, but it seems unlikely many voters will adopt them without a change in incentives. Finally, Part IV outlines how we might have better incentives to assess facts and claims to expertise well if we make fewer decisions through ballot box voting, and more by “voting with our feet.”. © 2020, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
@article{somin_trust_2020,
title = {Trust and political ignorance},
volume = {54},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-44018-3_11},
abstract = {We often hear claims that there is too much political distrust—so much so that society has become deeply divided and democracy itself may be imperiled as a result. At the same time, many also argue that citizens are too ready to believe “fake news,” conspiracy theories, and other dubious material on political issues, thereby also potentially threatening the viability of democracy. These complaints are in some tension with each other. How can people be both lacking in trust, and highly gullible at the same time? But the tension is more apparent than real. The two problems are rooted in common dynamics of political ignorance and irrationality. Part I outlines the basic logic of rational political ignorance, and the related phenomenon of “rational irrationality”—biased evaluation of evidence. Part II applies this logic to current concerns about “fake news” and distrust of experts. In Part III, I explain why some substantial degree of deference to experts is desirable, and probably unavoidable. The key question is whether people can find the right information sources to trust. A number of strategies can help address this, but it seems unlikely many voters will adopt them without a change in incentives. Finally, Part IV outlines how we might have better incentives to assess facts and claims to expertise well if we make fewer decisions through ballot box voting, and more by “voting with our feet.”. © 2020, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.},
journal = {Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics},
author = {Somin, I.},
year = {2020},
keywords = {11 Ignorance and democracy, Conspiracy, Democracy, Fake news, Ignorance, PRINTED (Fonds papier), Trust},
pages = {153--169},
}
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