When concepts lose their color: A case of object-color knowledge impairment. Stasenko, A., Garcea, F. E., Dombovy, M., & Mahon, B. Z. Cortex, 58:217–238, September, 2014.
Paper doi abstract bibtex Color is important in our daily interactions with objects, and plays a role in both low- and high-level visual processing. Previous neuropsychological studies have shown that color perception and object-color knowledge can doubly dissociate, and that both can dissociate from processing of object form. We present a case study of an individual who displayed an impairment for knowledge of the typical colors of objects, with preserved color perception and color naming. Our case also presented with a pattern of, if anything, worse performance for naming living items compared to non-living things. The findings of the experimental investigation are evaluated in light of two theories of conceptual organization in the brain: the Sensory/Functional Theory and the Domain-Specific Hypothesis. The dissociations observed in this case compel a model in which sensory/motor modality and semantic domain jointly constrain the organization of object knowledge.
@article{stasenko_when_2014,
title = {When concepts lose their color: {A} case of object-color knowledge impairment},
volume = {58},
issn = {00109452},
shorttitle = {When concepts lose their color},
url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010945214001841},
doi = {10/f6f6bg},
abstract = {Color is important in our daily interactions with objects, and plays a role in both low- and high-level visual processing. Previous neuropsychological studies have shown that color perception and object-color knowledge can doubly dissociate, and that both can dissociate from processing of object form. We present a case study of an individual who displayed an impairment for knowledge of the typical colors of objects, with preserved color perception and color naming. Our case also presented with a pattern of, if anything, worse performance for naming living items compared to non-living things. The findings of the experimental investigation are evaluated in light of two theories of conceptual organization in the brain: the Sensory/Functional Theory and the Domain-Specific Hypothesis. The dissociations observed in this case compel a model in which sensory/motor modality and semantic domain jointly constrain the organization of object knowledge.},
language = {en},
urldate = {2023-01-03},
journal = {Cortex},
author = {Stasenko, Alena and Garcea, Frank E. and Dombovy, Mary and Mahon, Bradford Z.},
month = sep,
year = {2014},
pages = {217--238},
}
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