Malcolm on impure memory. Stiffler, E. Philosophical Studies, 38(3):299–304, 1980. ![Malcolm on impure memory [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex [first paragraph] At the outset of 'A Definition of Factual Memory' Norman Malcolm excludes certain possible counter-examples to the well-known definition he goes on to propose.1 The cases excluded are ones in which a person who did not know that p at t claims correctly to remember that p from t. Malcolm cites two such cases. In one, I claim to remember that I saw a cardinal in the feeder last week even though I couldn't then identify cardinals and have only recently learned how to do so. In the other, I claim to remember that the house I lived in as a child faced the west even though as a child I merely noticed that it faced the setting sun and only some years later have come to realize this implies the house faced the west. According to Malcolm, both memory claims are correct but only in an elliptical sense. In both cases I would be willing to substitute for my original claim a conjunction consisting of a different factual memory claim and a non-memory statement. For example, in the cardinal case, the suggested conjunction is 'I remember that I saw this bird (or: a bird of this kind) and now I know it was a cardinal'.' Because the original claims are replaceable in this way, Malcolm describes them as expressing 'impure' factual memory. As his definition of factual memory is intended to capture only pure factual memory, of memory "with no admixture of inference or present realization", these cases do not count against it.
@article{Stiffler1980,
abstract = {[first paragraph] At the outset of 'A Definition of Factual Memory' Norman Malcolm excludes certain possible counter-examples to the well-known definition he goes on to propose.1 The cases excluded are ones in which a person who did not know that p at t claims correctly to remember that p from t. Malcolm cites two such cases. In one, I claim to remember that I saw a cardinal in the feeder last week even though I couldn't then identify cardinals and have only recently learned how to do so. In the other, I claim to remember that the house I lived in as a child faced the west even though as a child I merely noticed that it faced the setting sun and only some years later have come to realize this implies the house faced the west. According to Malcolm, both memory claims are correct but only in an elliptical sense. In both cases I would be willing to substitute for my original claim a conjunction consisting of a different factual memory claim and a non-memory statement. For example, in the cardinal case, the suggested conjunction is 'I remember that I saw this bird (or: a bird of this kind) and now I know it was a cardinal'.' Because the original claims are replaceable in this way, Malcolm describes them as expressing 'impure' factual memory. As his definition of factual memory is intended to capture only pure factual memory, of memory "with no admixture of inference or present realization", these cases do not count against it.},
author = {Stiffler, Eric},
doi = {10.1007/BF00375663},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Stiffler - 1980 - Malcolm on impure memory.pdf:pdf},
issn = {0031-8116},
journal = {Philosophical Studies},
number = {3},
pages = {299--304},
title = {{Malcolm on impure memory}},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00375663},
volume = {38},
year = {1980}
}
Downloads: 0
{"_id":"Hhuwzx9QcdN9ER8dw","bibbaseid":"stiffler-malcolmonimpurememory-1980","downloads":0,"creationDate":"2019-01-05T09:36:45.942Z","title":"Malcolm on impure memory","author_short":["Stiffler, E."],"year":1980,"bibtype":"article","biburl":"http://phil-mem.org/phil-mem.bib/","bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","abstract":"[first paragraph] At the outset of 'A Definition of Factual Memory' Norman Malcolm excludes certain possible counter-examples to the well-known definition he goes on to propose.1 The cases excluded are ones in which a person who did not know that p at t claims correctly to remember that p from t. Malcolm cites two such cases. In one, I claim to remember that I saw a cardinal in the feeder last week even though I couldn't then identify cardinals and have only recently learned how to do so. In the other, I claim to remember that the house I lived in as a child faced the west even though as a child I merely noticed that it faced the setting sun and only some years later have come to realize this implies the house faced the west. According to Malcolm, both memory claims are correct but only in an elliptical sense. In both cases I would be willing to substitute for my original claim a conjunction consisting of a different factual memory claim and a non-memory statement. For example, in the cardinal case, the suggested conjunction is 'I remember that I saw this bird (or: a bird of this kind) and now I know it was a cardinal'.' Because the original claims are replaceable in this way, Malcolm describes them as expressing 'impure' factual memory. As his definition of factual memory is intended to capture only pure factual memory, of memory \"with no admixture of inference or present realization\", these cases do not count against it.","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Stiffler"],"firstnames":["Eric"],"suffixes":[]}],"doi":"10.1007/BF00375663","file":":Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Stiffler - 1980 - Malcolm on impure memory.pdf:pdf","issn":"0031-8116","journal":"Philosophical Studies","number":"3","pages":"299–304","title":"Malcolm on impure memory","url":"http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00375663","volume":"38","year":"1980","bibtex":"@article{Stiffler1980,\nabstract = {[first paragraph] At the outset of 'A Definition of Factual Memory' Norman Malcolm excludes certain possible counter-examples to the well-known definition he goes on to propose.1 The cases excluded are ones in which a person who did not know that p at t claims correctly to remember that p from t. Malcolm cites two such cases. In one, I claim to remember that I saw a cardinal in the feeder last week even though I couldn't then identify cardinals and have only recently learned how to do so. In the other, I claim to remember that the house I lived in as a child faced the west even though as a child I merely noticed that it faced the setting sun and only some years later have come to realize this implies the house faced the west. According to Malcolm, both memory claims are correct but only in an elliptical sense. In both cases I would be willing to substitute for my original claim a conjunction consisting of a different factual memory claim and a non-memory statement. For example, in the cardinal case, the suggested conjunction is 'I remember that I saw this bird (or: a bird of this kind) and now I know it was a cardinal'.' Because the original claims are replaceable in this way, Malcolm describes them as expressing 'impure' factual memory. As his definition of factual memory is intended to capture only pure factual memory, of memory \"with no admixture of inference or present realization\", these cases do not count against it.},\nauthor = {Stiffler, Eric},\ndoi = {10.1007/BF00375663},\nfile = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Stiffler - 1980 - Malcolm on impure memory.pdf:pdf},\nissn = {0031-8116},\njournal = {Philosophical Studies},\nnumber = {3},\npages = {299--304},\ntitle = {{Malcolm on impure memory}},\nurl = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00375663},\nvolume = {38},\nyear = {1980}\n}\n","author_short":["Stiffler, E."],"key":"Stiffler1980","id":"Stiffler1980","bibbaseid":"stiffler-malcolmonimpurememory-1980","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00375663"},"downloads":0},"search_terms":["malcolm","impure","memory","stiffler"],"keywords":[],"authorIDs":[],"dataSources":["xpm4HPGis5kQeHY7z"]}