Crossing the bridge: The first-person and time. Stokes, P. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(2):295–312, 2014. ![Crossing the bridge: The first-person and time [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex Personal identity theory has become increasingly sensitive to the im- portance of the first-person perspective. However, certain ways of speaking about that perspective do not allow the full temporal aspects of first-person perspec- tives on the self to come into view. In this paper I consider two recent phenom- enologically-informed discussions of personal identity that end up yielding metaphysically divergent views of the self: those of Barry Dainton and Galen Strawson. I argue that when we take a properly temporally indexical view of the first-person perspective, and thereby resist the assumption that phenomenally- figured and theoretically-figured identity claims must have a common object, the metaphysically awkward accommodations each of these authors is compelled to make cease to be necessary. Keywords
@article{Stokes2014,
abstract = {Personal identity theory has become increasingly sensitive to the im- portance of the first-person perspective. However, certain ways of speaking about that perspective do not allow the full temporal aspects of first-person perspec- tives on the self to come into view. In this paper I consider two recent phenom- enologically-informed discussions of personal identity that end up yielding metaphysically divergent views of the self: those of Barry Dainton and Galen Strawson. I argue that when we take a properly temporally indexical view of the first-person perspective, and thereby resist the assumption that phenomenally- figured and theoretically-figured identity claims must have a common object, the metaphysically awkward accommodations each of these authors is compelled to make cease to be necessary. Keywords},
author = {Stokes, Patrick},
doi = {10.1007/s11097-013-9302-6},
file = {:Users/michaelk/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Stokes - 2014 - Crossing the bridge The first-person and time.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {0001-4575},
issn = {1568-7759},
journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
number = {2},
pages = {295--312},
title = {{Crossing the bridge: The first-person and time}},
url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11097-013-9302-6},
volume = {13},
year = {2014}
}
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