Luck Has Nothing to Do with It: Prevailing Uncertainty and Responsibilities of Due Care. Szentkirályi, L. Ethics, Policy & Environment, 23(3):261–280, September, 2020. Publisher: Routledge _eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848185![Luck Has Nothing to Do with It: Prevailing Uncertainty and Responsibilities of Due Care [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex We are surrounded by threats of environmental harm whose actual dangers to public health are scientifically unverified. It is widely presumed that under conditions of uncertainty, when it is not possible to foresee the outcomes of our actions, or to calculate the probability they will actually cause harm, we cannot be held culpable for the risks and harms our actions impose on others. It is commonly presumed, that is, that exposing others to what this paper terms ‘uncertain threats’ is permissible, because conventional theories of moral responsibility understand uncertainty as implying that the effects of our actions are out of our control and, therefore, beyond our fault. In contrast, in rejecting arguments from moral luck, this paper denies that authors of uncertain threats of environmental harm are excusably ignorant, and denies that prevailing uncertainty diminishes their moral obligations or attenuates their culpability. For under conditions of uncertainty, culpability turns on the lack of due regard for others as moral equals – a consideration that neither luck nor ignorance excuses. To expose others to unconsented-to uncertain threats of harm without exercising due care to prevent possible injury is to wrongfully gamble with their welfare and their capacity for self-authorship.
@article{szentkiralyi_luck_2020,
title = {Luck {Has} {Nothing} to {Do} with {It}: {Prevailing} {Uncertainty} and {Responsibilities} of {Due} {Care}},
volume = {23},
issn = {2155-0085},
shorttitle = {Luck {Has} {Nothing} to {Do} with {It}},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848185},
doi = {10.1080/21550085.2020.1848185},
abstract = {We are surrounded by threats of environmental harm whose actual dangers to public health are scientifically unverified. It is widely presumed that under conditions of uncertainty, when it is not possible to foresee the outcomes of our actions, or to calculate the probability they will actually cause harm, we cannot be held culpable for the risks and harms our actions impose on others. It is commonly presumed, that is, that exposing others to what this paper terms ‘uncertain threats’ is permissible, because conventional theories of moral responsibility understand uncertainty as implying that the effects of our actions are out of our control and, therefore, beyond our fault. In contrast, in rejecting arguments from moral luck, this paper denies that authors of uncertain threats of environmental harm are excusably ignorant, and denies that prevailing uncertainty diminishes their moral obligations or attenuates their culpability. For under conditions of uncertainty, culpability turns on the lack of due regard for others as moral equals – a consideration that neither luck nor ignorance excuses. To expose others to unconsented-to uncertain threats of harm without exercising due care to prevent possible injury is to wrongfully gamble with their welfare and their capacity for self-authorship.},
number = {3},
urldate = {2021-04-22},
journal = {Ethics, Policy \& Environment},
author = {Szentkirályi, Levente},
month = sep,
year = {2020},
note = {Publisher: Routledge
\_eprint: https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2020.1848185},
keywords = {Ignorance in philosophy and logic, Moral luck, PRINTED (Fonds papier), culpability, due care, reasonable ignorance, reciprocity, risk impositions, uncertain threats},
pages = {261--280},
}
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