Australia and Asia’s maritime disputes: continuity amidst chaos. Taylor, B. February, 2016.
Australia and Asia’s maritime disputes: continuity amidst chaos [link]Paper  abstract   bibtex   
Introduction For a relatively distant country with no territorial claims, Australia has been a remarkably vocal presence around the East and South China Sea disputes. Canberra issued arguably the strongest rebuke of any capital when it called in the Chinese ambassador and released a robust public statement following Beijing’s November 2013 declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over disputed islands in the East China Sea. In May 2014, at the most heated gathering to date of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the Australian defense minister literally stood shoulder-to-shoulder with his American and Japanese counterparts in condemning China’s “unwarranted” and “damaging” unilateral behavior in the East and South China seas. Prime Minister Tony Abbott used even stronger language in June 2015 when he stated bluntly that Australia “deplores” unilateral action that would alter the status quo in the South China Sea. During the 2014-2015 period, Australia also reportedly began increasing military surveillance flights over the South China Sea, much to the chagrin of the Chinese government. When Malcolm Turnbull became the twenty-ninth prime minister of Australia in September 2015 following a “bloodless coup” to depose Abbott, speculation was rife that this development would bring about nothing short of a sea change in Australia’s relations with Asia’s major powers and, consequently, in its approach towards this region’s maritime disputes. The prominent Australian defense intellectual Hugh White observed that Turnbull believes that the rise of Asia “will inevitably drive major changes in the way the world works,” but that he “does not assume that America has necessarily worked out how best to respond to this challenge” and “certainly doesn’t buy [the] idea of muscling up to China militarily.” White went on to note that Turnbull exhibits a “deep curiosity about China…simply because he seems to see it as the most interesting, as well as perhaps the most important, place in the world today.” Turnbull’s ascendency, thus, caused some in the Australian business community to salivate. Billionaire James Packer, for instance, has reportedly predicted that “Turnbull will lead Australia towards its economic destiny because he understands China and its importance.” Indeed, such concerns had also allegedly generated anxieties within the US intelligence community that the new prime minister is dangerously “soft” on China. Prediction is an inevitably perilous exercise, especially so when it comes to Australian prime ministers. As Michael Wesley documents in his highly acclaimed book The Howard Paradox, initial expectations that the prime ministership of John Howard would irreparably damage Australia’s standing in Asia failed to be proven true. Instead, Howard presided over what amounted to a “golden decade” in Australia’s engagement with this region. Similarly, speculation that Howard’s successor, the mandarin-speaking Kevin Rudd, would essentially be a “Manchurian candidate” given his longstanding scholarly interest and diplomatic experience in China also never were confirmed by reality. Instead, Rudd was ultimately revealed to be a self-described “brutal realist” on China, who was prepared to publicly raise such sensitive issues as Beijing’s human rights practices and whose government produced a defense white paper widely considered to be Australia’s most confrontational thus far in relation to that country. In truth, as these examples illustrate, it remains far too early to judge in any definitive sense whether the Turnbull government will chart a markedly different course for Australia in its relations with Asia’s major powers and, in turn, in Canberra’s approach towards the East and South China sea disputes. That said, while there will almost certainly be a change in the tone of Australia’s foreign policy away from that adopted by the divisive and sometimes abrasive Tony Abbott, this article argues that the initial months of the Turnbull government suggest that there is likely to be a greater level of continuity than change when it comes to the substance of Canberra’s approach towards Asia’s maritime disputes. Indeed, barring a handful of temporary policy oscillations, the case is made that the trajectory of Australia’s approach towards Asia’s major powers more broadly has actually remained remarkably consistent for the better part of two decades. Several sources of continuity identified in the concluding section strongly suggest that it will remain so under Turnbull’s watch.
@misc{taylor_australia_2016,
	type = {Text},
	title = {Australia and {Asia}’s maritime disputes: continuity amidst chaos},
	copyright = {The Asan Forum Limited 2013},
	shorttitle = {Australia and {Asia}’s maritime disputes},
	url = {https://apo.org.au/node/61786},
	abstract = {Introduction For a relatively distant country with no territorial claims, Australia has been a remarkably vocal presence around the East and South China Sea disputes. Canberra issued arguably the strongest rebuke of any capital when it called in the Chinese ambassador and released a robust public statement following Beijing’s November 2013 declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over disputed islands in the East China Sea. In May 2014, at the most heated gathering to date of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the Australian defense minister literally stood shoulder-to-shoulder with his American and Japanese counterparts in condemning China’s “unwarranted” and “damaging” unilateral behavior in the East and South China seas. Prime Minister Tony Abbott used even stronger language in June 2015 when he stated bluntly that Australia “deplores” unilateral action that would alter the status quo in the South China Sea. During the 2014-2015 period, Australia also reportedly began increasing military surveillance flights over the South China Sea, much to the chagrin of the Chinese government. When Malcolm Turnbull became the twenty-ninth prime minister of Australia in September 2015 following a “bloodless coup” to depose Abbott, speculation was rife that this development would bring about nothing short of a sea change in Australia’s relations with Asia’s major powers and, consequently, in its approach towards this region’s maritime disputes. The prominent Australian defense intellectual Hugh White observed that Turnbull believes that the rise of Asia “will inevitably drive major changes in the way the world works,” but that he “does not assume that America has necessarily worked out how best to respond to this challenge” and “certainly doesn’t buy [the] idea of muscling up to China militarily.” White went on to note that Turnbull exhibits a “deep curiosity about China…simply because he seems to see it as the most interesting, as well as perhaps the most important, place in the world today.” Turnbull’s ascendency, thus, caused some in the Australian business community to salivate. Billionaire James Packer, for instance, has reportedly predicted that “Turnbull will lead Australia towards its economic destiny because he understands China and its importance.” Indeed, such concerns had also allegedly generated anxieties within the US intelligence community that the new prime minister is dangerously “soft” on China. Prediction is an inevitably perilous exercise, especially so when it comes to Australian prime ministers. As Michael Wesley documents in his highly acclaimed book The Howard Paradox, initial expectations that the prime ministership of John Howard would irreparably damage Australia’s standing in Asia failed to be proven true. Instead, Howard presided over what amounted to a “golden decade” in Australia’s engagement with this region. Similarly, speculation that Howard’s successor, the mandarin-speaking Kevin Rudd, would essentially be a “Manchurian candidate” given his longstanding scholarly interest and diplomatic experience in China also never were confirmed by reality. Instead, Rudd was ultimately revealed to be a self-described “brutal realist” on China, who was prepared to publicly raise such sensitive issues as Beijing’s human rights practices and whose government produced a defense white paper widely considered to be Australia’s most confrontational thus far in relation to that country. In truth, as these examples illustrate, it remains far too early to judge in any definitive sense whether the Turnbull government will chart a markedly different course for Australia in its relations with Asia’s major powers and, in turn, in Canberra’s approach towards the East and South China sea disputes. That said, while there will almost certainly be a change in the tone of Australia’s foreign policy away from that adopted by the divisive and sometimes abrasive Tony Abbott, this article argues that the initial months of the Turnbull government suggest that there is likely to be a greater level of continuity than change when it comes to the substance of Canberra’s approach towards Asia’s maritime disputes. Indeed, barring a handful of temporary policy oscillations, the case is made that the trajectory of Australia’s approach towards Asia’s major powers more broadly has actually remained remarkably consistent for the better part of two decades. Several sources of continuity identified in the concluding section strongly suggest that it will remain so under Turnbull’s watch.},
	urldate = {2019-04-06TZ},
	journal = {APO},
	author = {Taylor, Brendan},
	month = feb,
	year = {2016}
}
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