@article{tononi_information_2004,
	title = {An information integration theory of consciousness},
	volume = {5},
	issn = {1471-2202},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1471-2202-5-42},
	doi = {10.1186/1471-2202-5-42},
	abstract = {BACKGROUND: Consciousness poses two main problems. The first is
understanding the conditions that determine to what extent a system has
conscious experience. For instance, why is our consciousness generated by
certain parts of our brain, such as the thalamocortical system, and not by
other parts, such as the cerebellum? And why are we conscious during
wakefulness and much less so during dreamless sleep? The second problem is
understanding the conditions that determine what kind of consciousness a
system has. For example, why do specific parts of the brain contribute
specific qualities to our conscious experience, such as vision and
audition? PRESENTATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS: This paper presents a theory
about what consciousness is and how it can be measured. According to the
theory, consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate
information. This claim is motivated by two key phenomenological
properties of consciousness: differentiation - the availability of a very
large number of conscious experiences; and integration - the unity of each
such experience. The theory states that the quantity of consciousness
available to a system can be measured as the Phi value of a complex of
elements. Phi is the amount of causally effective information that can be
integrated across the informational weakest link of a subset of elements.
A complex is a subset of elements with Phi{\textgreater}0 that is not part of a subset
of higher Phi. The theory also claims that the quality of consciousness is
determined by the informational relationships among the elements of a
complex, which are specified by the values of effective information among
them. Finally, each particular conscious experience is specified by the
value, at any given time, of the variables mediating informational
interactions among the elements of a complex. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS: The
information integration theory accounts, in a principled manner, for
several neurobiological observations concerning consciousness. As shown
here, these include the association of consciousness with certain neural
systems rather than with others; the fact that neural processes underlying
consciousness can influence or be influenced by neural processes that
remain unconscious; the reduction of consciousness during dreamless sleep
and generalized seizures; and the time requirements on neural interactions
that support consciousness. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HYPOTHESIS: The theory
entails that consciousness is a fundamental quantity, that it is graded,
that it is present in infants and animals, and that it should be possible
to build conscious artifacts.},
	journal = {BMC Neurosci.},
	author = {Tononi, Giulio},
	month = nov,
	year = {2004},
	pages = {42},
}

{"_id":"fgiKoGLSb3i3XjsNp","bibbaseid":"tononi-aninformationintegrationtheoryofconsciousness-2004","authorIDs":[],"author_short":["Tononi, G."],"bibdata":{"bibtype":"article","type":"article","title":"An information integration theory of consciousness","volume":"5","issn":"1471-2202","url":"http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1471-2202-5-42","doi":"10.1186/1471-2202-5-42","abstract":"BACKGROUND: Consciousness poses two main problems. The first is understanding the conditions that determine to what extent a system has conscious experience. For instance, why is our consciousness generated by certain parts of our brain, such as the thalamocortical system, and not by other parts, such as the cerebellum? And why are we conscious during wakefulness and much less so during dreamless sleep? The second problem is understanding the conditions that determine what kind of consciousness a system has. For example, why do specific parts of the brain contribute specific qualities to our conscious experience, such as vision and audition? PRESENTATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS: This paper presents a theory about what consciousness is and how it can be measured. According to the theory, consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate information. This claim is motivated by two key phenomenological properties of consciousness: differentiation - the availability of a very large number of conscious experiences; and integration - the unity of each such experience. The theory states that the quantity of consciousness available to a system can be measured as the Phi value of a complex of elements. Phi is the amount of causally effective information that can be integrated across the informational weakest link of a subset of elements. A complex is a subset of elements with Phi\\textgreater0 that is not part of a subset of higher Phi. The theory also claims that the quality of consciousness is determined by the informational relationships among the elements of a complex, which are specified by the values of effective information among them. Finally, each particular conscious experience is specified by the value, at any given time, of the variables mediating informational interactions among the elements of a complex. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS: The information integration theory accounts, in a principled manner, for several neurobiological observations concerning consciousness. As shown here, these include the association of consciousness with certain neural systems rather than with others; the fact that neural processes underlying consciousness can influence or be influenced by neural processes that remain unconscious; the reduction of consciousness during dreamless sleep and generalized seizures; and the time requirements on neural interactions that support consciousness. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HYPOTHESIS: The theory entails that consciousness is a fundamental quantity, that it is graded, that it is present in infants and animals, and that it should be possible to build conscious artifacts.","journal":"BMC Neurosci.","author":[{"propositions":[],"lastnames":["Tononi"],"firstnames":["Giulio"],"suffixes":[]}],"month":"November","year":"2004","pages":"42","bibtex":"@article{tononi_information_2004,\n\ttitle = {An information integration theory of consciousness},\n\tvolume = {5},\n\tissn = {1471-2202},\n\turl = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1471-2202-5-42},\n\tdoi = {10.1186/1471-2202-5-42},\n\tabstract = {BACKGROUND: Consciousness poses two main problems. The first is\nunderstanding the conditions that determine to what extent a system has\nconscious experience. For instance, why is our consciousness generated by\ncertain parts of our brain, such as the thalamocortical system, and not by\nother parts, such as the cerebellum? And why are we conscious during\nwakefulness and much less so during dreamless sleep? The second problem is\nunderstanding the conditions that determine what kind of consciousness a\nsystem has. For example, why do specific parts of the brain contribute\nspecific qualities to our conscious experience, such as vision and\naudition? PRESENTATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS: This paper presents a theory\nabout what consciousness is and how it can be measured. According to the\ntheory, consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate\ninformation. This claim is motivated by two key phenomenological\nproperties of consciousness: differentiation - the availability of a very\nlarge number of conscious experiences; and integration - the unity of each\nsuch experience. The theory states that the quantity of consciousness\navailable to a system can be measured as the Phi value of a complex of\nelements. Phi is the amount of causally effective information that can be\nintegrated across the informational weakest link of a subset of elements.\nA complex is a subset of elements with Phi{\\textgreater}0 that is not part of a subset\nof higher Phi. The theory also claims that the quality of consciousness is\ndetermined by the informational relationships among the elements of a\ncomplex, which are specified by the values of effective information among\nthem. Finally, each particular conscious experience is specified by the\nvalue, at any given time, of the variables mediating informational\ninteractions among the elements of a complex. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS: The\ninformation integration theory accounts, in a principled manner, for\nseveral neurobiological observations concerning consciousness. As shown\nhere, these include the association of consciousness with certain neural\nsystems rather than with others; the fact that neural processes underlying\nconsciousness can influence or be influenced by neural processes that\nremain unconscious; the reduction of consciousness during dreamless sleep\nand generalized seizures; and the time requirements on neural interactions\nthat support consciousness. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HYPOTHESIS: The theory\nentails that consciousness is a fundamental quantity, that it is graded,\nthat it is present in infants and animals, and that it should be possible\nto build conscious artifacts.},\n\tjournal = {BMC Neurosci.},\n\tauthor = {Tononi, Giulio},\n\tmonth = nov,\n\tyear = {2004},\n\tpages = {42},\n}\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n","author_short":["Tononi, G."],"key":"tononi_information_2004","id":"tononi_information_2004","bibbaseid":"tononi-aninformationintegrationtheoryofconsciousness-2004","role":"author","urls":{"Paper":"http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/1471-2202-5-42"},"metadata":{"authorlinks":{}},"downloads":0,"html":""},"bibtype":"article","biburl":"https://bibbase.org/zotero/rbonino","creationDate":"2020-01-27T02:13:34.694Z","downloads":0,"keywords":[],"search_terms":["information","integration","theory","consciousness","tononi"],"title":"An information integration theory of consciousness","year":2004,"dataSources":["hEoKh4ygEAWbAZ5iy","spEgaqPu3Z7pZaoxN"]}