Failing to ignore the ignorant: Mistaking ignorance for error. Vaz, A. & Mata, A. Judgment and Decision Making, 17(5):937–961, 2022. abstract bibtex Expertise is a reliable cue for accuracy – experts are often correct in their judgments and opinions. However, the opposite is not necessarily the case – ignorant judges are not guaranteed to err. Specifically, in a question with a dichotomous response option, an ignorant responder has a 50% chance of being correct. In five studies, we show that people fail to understand this, and that they overgeneralize a sound heuristic (expertise signals accuracy) to cases where it does not apply (lack of expertise does not imply error). These studies show that people 1) tend to think that the responses of an ignorant person to dichotomous-response questions are more likely to be incorrect than correct, and 2) they tend to respond the opposite of what the ignorant person responded. This research also shows that this bias is at least partially intuitive in nature, as it manifests more clearly in quick gut responses than in slow careful responses. Still, it is not completely corrected upon careful deliberation. Implications are discussed for rationality and epistemic vigilance. © 2022. The authors license this article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
@article{vaz_failing_2022,
title = {Failing to ignore the ignorant: {Mistaking} ignorance for error},
volume = {17},
issn = {1930-2975},
shorttitle = {Failing to ignore the ignorant},
abstract = {Expertise is a reliable cue for accuracy – experts are often correct in their judgments and opinions. However, the opposite is not necessarily the case – ignorant judges are not guaranteed to err. Specifically, in a question with a dichotomous response option, an ignorant responder has a 50\% chance of being correct. In five studies, we show that people fail to understand this, and that they overgeneralize a sound heuristic (expertise signals accuracy) to cases where it does not apply (lack of expertise does not imply error). These studies show that people 1) tend to think that the responses of an ignorant person to dichotomous-response questions are more likely to be incorrect than correct, and 2) they tend to respond the opposite of what the ignorant person responded. This research also shows that this bias is at least partially intuitive in nature, as it manifests more clearly in quick gut responses than in slow careful responses. Still, it is not completely corrected upon careful deliberation. Implications are discussed for rationality and epistemic vigilance. © 2022. The authors license this article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.},
language = {English},
number = {5},
journal = {Judgment and Decision Making},
author = {Vaz, A. and Mata, A.},
year = {2022},
keywords = {Advice taking, Error, Expertise, Heuristics, Ignorance, Social influence},
pages = {937--961},
}
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