k-Anonymous Message Transmission. von Ahn, L., Bortz, A., & Hopper, N., J. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, pages 122-130, 2003. ACM Press. ![k-Anonymous Message Transmission [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Website abstract bibtex Informally, a communication protocol is sender k-anonymous if it can guarantee that an
adversary, trying to determine the sender of a particular message, can only narrow down its
search to a set of k suspects. Receiver k-anonymity places a similar guarantee on the receiver:
an adversary, at best, can only narrow down the possible receivers to a set of size k. In this paper
we introduce the notions of sender and receiver k-anonymity and consider their applications.
We show that there exist simple and efficient protocols which are k-anonymous for both the
sender and the receiver in a model where a polynomial time adversary can see all traffic in the
network and can control up to a constant fraction of the participants. Our protocol is provably
secure, practical, and does not require the existence of trusted third parties. This paper also
provides a conceptually simple augmentation to Chaum's DC-Nets that adds robustness against
adversaries who attempt to disrupt the protocol through perpetual transmission or selective
non-participation.
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title = {k-Anonymous Message Transmission},
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year = {2003},
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abstract = {Informally, a communication protocol is sender k-anonymous if it can guarantee that an
adversary, trying to determine the sender of a particular message, can only narrow down its
search to a set of k suspects. Receiver k-anonymity places a similar guarantee on the receiver:
an adversary, at best, can only narrow down the possible receivers to a set of size k. In this paper
we introduce the notions of sender and receiver k-anonymity and consider their applications.
We show that there exist simple and efficient protocols which are k-anonymous for both the
sender and the receiver in a model where a polynomial time adversary can see all traffic in the
network and can control up to a constant fraction of the participants. Our protocol is provably
secure, practical, and does not require the existence of trusted third parties. This paper also
provides a conceptually simple augmentation to Chaum's DC-Nets that adds robustness against
adversaries who attempt to disrupt the protocol through perpetual transmission or selective
non-participation.},
bibtype = {inProceedings},
author = {von Ahn, Luis and Bortz, Andrew and Hopper, Nicholas J},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security}
}
Downloads: 0
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