A critical reflection on the gap-filling function of general principles of law. Wang, Y. Cambridge International Law Journal, 11(1):96–117, June, 2022. Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Section: Cambridge International Law Journal
A critical reflection on the gap-filling function of general principles of law [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
It is well established in international legal scholarship that general principles of law (GPL) have an important function of gap-filling. However, there are many controversies about the concept and the usages of gap-filling. It is unclear what gap-filling means in legal doctrines. Moreover, the judgments of the International Court of Justice rarely mention the gap-filling function of GPL. With these controversies, one may even ponder that the gap-filling function may have been over-claimed by legal scholars. This article takes stock of these questions and critically engages with the implications of having the gap-filling function as a cardinal function of GPL. It provides four aspects of critiques on the gap-filling discourse on the basis of the genesis of gap-filling, relevant legal doctrines and judicial practices. By providing these critiques, this article argues against an established episteme in international law that the gap-filling function is a major function of GPL. Moreover, it notes that scholars tend to attribute the gap-filling function to GPL because they have a vision of the lex ferenda of international law.
@article{wang_critical_2022,
	title = {A critical reflection on the gap-filling function of general principles of law},
	volume = {11},
	issn = {2398-9173, 2398-9181},
	url = {https://unog.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/41UNOG_INST/1uhj92k/cdi_crossref_primary_10_4337_cilj_2022_01_05},
	doi = {10.4337/cilj.2022.01.05},
	abstract = {It is well established in international legal scholarship that general principles of law (GPL) have an important function of gap-filling. However, there are many controversies about the concept and the usages of gap-filling. It is unclear what gap-filling means in legal doctrines. Moreover, the judgments of the International Court of Justice rarely mention the gap-filling function of GPL. With these controversies, one may even ponder that the gap-filling function may have been over-claimed by legal scholars. This article takes stock of these questions and critically engages with the implications of having the gap-filling function as a cardinal function of GPL. It provides four aspects of critiques on the gap-filling discourse on the basis of the genesis of gap-filling, relevant legal doctrines and judicial practices. By providing these critiques, this article argues against an established episteme in international law that the gap-filling function is a major function of GPL. Moreover, it notes that scholars tend to attribute the gap-filling function to GPL because they have a vision of the lex ferenda of international law.},
	language = {en},
	number = {1},
	urldate = {2023-04-16},
	journal = {Cambridge International Law Journal},
	author = {Wang, Yilin},
	month = jun,
	year = {2022},
	note = {Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
Section: Cambridge International Law Journal},
	pages = {96--117},
}

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