Correlating Spam Activity with IP Address Characteristics. Wilcox, C., Papadopoulos, C., & Heidemann, J. In Proceedings of the IEEE Global Internet Symposium, pages 1–6, San Diego, California, USA, March, 2010. IEEE.
Correlating Spam Activity with IP Address Characteristics [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
It is well known that spam bots mostly utilize compromised machines with certain address characteristics, such as dynamically allocated addresses, machines in specific geographic areas and IP ranges from AS' with more tolerant spam policies. Such machines tend to be less diligently administered and may exhibit less stability, more volatility, and shorter uptimes. However, few studies have attempted to quantify how such spam bot address characteristics compare with non-spamming hosts. Quantifying these characteristics may help provide important information for comprehensive spam mitigation. We use two large datasets, namely a commercial blacklist and an Internet-wide address visibility study to quantify address characteristics of spam and non-spam networks. We find that spam networks exhibit significantly less availability and uptime, and higher volatility than non-spam networks. In addition, we conduct a collateral damage study of a common practice where an ISP blocks the entire /24 prefix if spammers are detected in that range. We find that such a policy blacklists a significant portion of legitimate mail servers belonging to the same prefix.
@InProceedings{Wilcox10a,
	author = 	"Chris Wilcox and Christos Papadopoulos and John Heidemann",
	title = 	"Correlating Spam Activity with IP Address Characteristics",
	booktitle = 	"Proceedings of the " # " IEEE Global Internet Symposium",
	year = 		2010,
	sortdate = 		"2010-03-01",
	project = "ant, lander, madcat",
	jsubject = "network_security",
	pages = 	"1--6",
	address = 	"San Diego, California, USA",
	month = 	mar,
	publisher = 	"IEEE",
	doi = "http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/INFCOMW.2010.5466660",
	url =		"https://ant.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Wilcox10a.html",
	pdfurl =	"https://ant.isi.edu/%7ejohnh/PAPERS/Wilcox10a.pdf",
	myorganization = 	"USC/Information Sciences Institute",
	jlocation = 	"johnh: pafile",
	keywords = 	"spam, IP address analysis, correlation,
                  collateral damage",
	copyrightholder = "IEEE",
	copyrightterms = "	Personal use of this material is permitted.  However, 	permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising 	or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works         for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, 	or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works 	must be obtained from the IEEE. ",
	abstract = "It is well known that spam bots mostly utilize
                  compromised machines with certain address
                  characteristics, such as dynamically allocated
                  addresses, machines in specific geographic areas and
                  IP ranges from AS' with more tolerant spam
                  policies. Such machines tend to be less diligently
                  administered and may exhibit less stability, more
                  volatility, and shorter uptimes. However, few
                  studies have attempted to quantify how such spam bot
                  address characteristics compare with non-spamming
                  hosts. Quantifying these characteristics may help
                  provide important information for comprehensive spam
                  mitigation.  We use two large datasets, namely a
                  commercial blacklist and an Internet-wide address
                  visibility study to quantify address characteristics
                  of spam and non-spam networks. We find that spam
                  networks exhibit significantly less availability and
                  uptime, and higher volatility than non-spam
                  networks. In addition, we conduct a collateral
                  damage study of a common practice where an ISP
                  blocks the entire /24 prefix if spammers are
                  detected in that range.  We find that such a policy
                  blacklists a significant portion of legitimate mail
                  servers belonging to the same prefix.",
}

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