Ignorance, soundness, and norms of inquiry. Willard-Kyle, C. Philosophical Studies, May, 2024.
Ignorance, soundness, and norms of inquiry [link]Paper  doi  abstract   bibtex   
The current literature on norms of inquiry features two families of norms: norms that focus on an inquirer’s ignorance and norms that focus on the question’s soundness. I argue that, given a factive conception of ignorance, it’s possible to derive a soundness-style norm from a version of the ignorance norm. A crucial lemma in the argument is that just as one can only be ignorant of a proposition if the proposition is true, so one can only be ignorant with respect to a question if the question is sound.
@article{willard-kyle_ignorance_2024,
	title = {Ignorance, soundness, and norms of inquiry},
	issn = {1573-0883},
	url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02161-3},
	doi = {10.1007/s11098-024-02161-3},
	abstract = {The current literature on norms of inquiry features two families of norms: norms that focus on an inquirer’s ignorance and norms that focus on the question’s soundness. I argue that, given a factive conception of ignorance, it’s possible to derive a soundness-style norm from a version of the ignorance norm. A crucial lemma in the argument is that just as one can only be ignorant of a proposition if the proposition is true, so one can only be ignorant with respect to a question if the question is sound.},
	language = {en},
	urldate = {2024-06-17},
	journal = {Philosophical Studies},
	author = {Willard-Kyle, Christopher},
	month = may,
	year = {2024},
	keywords = {Ignorance, Inquiry, Questions, Soundness},
}

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