The Virtue of Epistemic Trustworthiness and Re-Posting on Social Media. Wright, S. In The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021. ![The Virtue of Epistemic Trustworthiness and Re-Posting on Social Media [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex Re-posting fake news on social media exposes others to epistemic risks that include not only false belief but also misguided trust in the source of the fake news. The risk of misguided trust comes from the fact that re-posting is a kind of credentialing; as a new kind of speech-act, re-posting does not yet have established norms and so runs an additional risk of “bent credentialing.” This chapter proposes that other-regarding epistemic virtues can help us mitigate the epistemic risks that come with re-posting—specifically the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness. It further considers how an epistemically trustworthy person should regulate her re-posting behavior in light of the psychological evidence that retracting false beliefs is far more difficult than might be supposed. Behaving in an epistemically trustworthy way requires being responsive to the real risks that our actions expose others to, as well as recognizing the real ways that others depend on us.
@incollection{wright_virtue_2021,
address = {Oxford},
title = {The {Virtue} of {Epistemic} {Trustworthiness} and {Re}-{Posting} on {Social} {Media}},
isbn = {978-0-19-886397-7},
url = {https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/10.1093/oso/9780198863977.001.0001/oso-9780198863977-chapter-12},
abstract = {Re-posting fake news on social media exposes others to epistemic risks that include not only false belief but also misguided trust in the source of the fake news. The risk of misguided trust comes from the fact that re-posting is a kind of credentialing; as a new kind of speech-act, re-posting does not yet have established norms and so runs an additional risk of “bent credentialing.” This chapter proposes that other-regarding epistemic virtues can help us mitigate the epistemic risks that come with re-posting—specifically the virtue of epistemic trustworthiness. It further considers how an epistemically trustworthy person should regulate her re-posting behavior in light of the psychological evidence that retracting false beliefs is far more difficult than might be supposed. Behaving in an epistemically trustworthy way requires being responsive to the real risks that our actions expose others to, as well as recognizing the real ways that others depend on us.},
language = {eng},
urldate = {2022-05-17},
booktitle = {The {Epistemology} of {Fake} {News}},
publisher = {Oxford University Press},
author = {Wright, Sarah},
year = {2021},
doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0012},
keywords = {9 Post-truth, fake-news and sciences, PRINTED (Fonds papier), bent credentialing, bent testimony, epistemic virtue, fake news, social media, trustworthiness},
}
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