Anti-SAT: Mitigating SAT Attack on Logic Locking. Xie, Y. & Srivastava, A. IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, PP(99):1–1, 2018. doi abstract bibtex Logic locking is a technique that’s proposed to protect outsourced IC designs from piracy and counterfeiting by untrusted foundries. A locked IC preserves the correct functionality only when a correct key is provided. Recently, the security of logic locking is threatened by a new attack called SAT attack, which can decipher the correct key of most logic locking techniques within a few hours subramanyan2015evaluating even for a reasonably large key-size. This attack iteratively solves SAT formulas which progressively eliminate the incorrect keys till the circuit is unlocked. In this paper, we present a circuit block (referred to as Anti-SAT block) to enhance the security of existing logic locking techniques against the SAT attack. We show using a mathematical proof that the number of SAT attack iterations to reveal the correct key in a circuit comprising an Anti-SAT block is an exponential function of the key-size thereby making the SAT attack computationally infeasible. Besides, we address the vulnerability of the Anti-SAT block to various removal attacks and investigate obfuscation techniques to prevent these removal attacks. More importantly, we provide a proof showing that these obfuscation techniques for making Anti-SAT un-removable would not weaken the Anti-SAT block’s resistance to SAT attack. Through our experiments, we illustrate the effectiveness of our approach to securing modern chips fabricated in untrusted foundries.
@article{xie_anti-sat:_2018,
title = {Anti-{SAT}: {Mitigating} {SAT} {Attack} on {Logic} {Locking}},
volume = {PP},
issn = {0278-0070},
shorttitle = {Anti-{SAT}},
doi = {10.1109/TCAD.2018.2801220},
abstract = {Logic locking is a technique that’s proposed to protect outsourced IC designs from piracy and counterfeiting by untrusted foundries. A locked IC preserves the correct functionality only when a correct key is provided. Recently, the security of logic locking is threatened by a new attack called SAT attack, which can decipher the correct key of most logic locking techniques within a few hours subramanyan2015evaluating even for a reasonably large key-size. This attack iteratively solves SAT formulas which progressively eliminate the incorrect keys till the circuit is unlocked. In this paper, we present a circuit block (referred to as Anti-SAT block) to enhance the security of existing logic locking techniques against the SAT attack. We show using a mathematical proof that the number of SAT attack iterations to reveal the correct key in a circuit comprising an Anti-SAT block is an exponential function of the key-size thereby making the SAT attack computationally infeasible. Besides, we address the vulnerability of the Anti-SAT block to various removal attacks and investigate obfuscation techniques to prevent these removal attacks. More importantly, we provide a proof showing that these obfuscation techniques for making Anti-SAT un-removable would not weaken the Anti-SAT block’s resistance to SAT attack. Through our experiments, we illustrate the effectiveness of our approach to securing modern chips fabricated in untrusted foundries.},
number = {99},
journal = {IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems},
author = {Xie, Y. and Srivastava, A.},
year = {2018},
pages = {1--1}
}
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