Possible Objects. Yagisawa, T. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Spring 2018 edition, 2018. ![Possible Objects [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper abstract bibtex Deep theorizing about possibility requires theorizing about possibleobjects. One popular approach regards the notion of a possible objectas intertwined with the notion of a possible world. There are twowidely discussed types of theory concerning the nature of possibleworlds: actualist representationism and possibilist realism. Theysupport two opposing views about possible objects. Examination of theways in which they do so reveals difficulties on both sides. There isanother popular approach, which has been influenced by the philosophyof Alexius Meinong. The Meinongian approach is relevant to theorizingabout possible objects because it attempts to construct a generaltheory of objects other than ordinary concrete existing objects.Independently of the debate about the nature of possible worlds orabout Meinongianism, it is not always as straightforward as it may atfirst appear to determine whether putative possible objects are indeedpossible. Another category of object similar to that of a possibleobject is the category of a fictional object. Although initiallyattractive, the idea that fictional objects are possible objectsshould not be accepted blindly. An important instance of theoreticalusefulness of possible objects is their central role in the validationof two controversial theorems of a simple quantified modal logic.
@incollection{yagisawa_possible_2018,
edition = {Spring 2018},
title = {Possible {Objects}},
url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/possible-objects/},
abstract = {Deep theorizing about possibility requires theorizing about possibleobjects. One popular approach regards the notion of a possible objectas intertwined with the notion of a possible world. There are twowidely discussed types of theory concerning the nature of possibleworlds: actualist representationism and possibilist realism. Theysupport two opposing views about possible objects. Examination of theways in which they do so reveals difficulties on both sides. There isanother popular approach, which has been influenced by the philosophyof Alexius Meinong. The Meinongian approach is relevant to theorizingabout possible objects because it attempts to construct a generaltheory of objects other than ordinary concrete existing objects.Independently of the debate about the nature of possible worlds orabout Meinongianism, it is not always as straightforward as it may atfirst appear to determine whether putative possible objects are indeedpossible. Another category of object similar to that of a possibleobject is the category of a fictional object. Although initiallyattractive, the idea that fictional objects are possible objectsshould not be accepted blindly. An important instance of theoreticalusefulness of possible objects is their central role in the validationof two controversial theorems of a simple quantified modal logic.},
urldate = {2019-12-20},
booktitle = {The {Stanford} {Encyclopedia} of {Philosophy}},
publisher = {Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University},
author = {Yagisawa, Takashi},
editor = {Zalta, Edward N.},
year = {2018},
keywords = {God: and other necessary beings, Lewis, David, Lewis, David: metaphysics, Meinong, Alexius, abstract objects, actualism, essential vs. accidental properties, existence, fictionalism: modal, haecceity: medieval theories of, identity: of indiscernibles, identity: over time, identity: transworld, impossible worlds, logic: free, logic: intensional, logic: modal, mereology, modality: medieval theories of, modality: varieties of, names, nonexistent objects, object, possible worlds, rigid designators, semantics: two-dimensional, substance, temporal parts}
}
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