Trusted Display on Untrusted Commodity Platforms. Yu, M., Gligor, V., D., & Zhou, Z. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), of CCS '15, pages 989-1003, 10, 2015. ACM. ![Trusted Display on Untrusted Commodity Platforms [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Website abstract bibtex A trusted display service assures the confidentiality and authenticity of content output by a security-sensitive application and thus prevents a compromised commodity operating system or application from surreptitiously reading or modifying the displayed output. Past approaches have failed to provide trusted display on commodity platforms that use modern graphics processing units (GPUs). For example, full GPU virtualization encourages the sharing of GPU address space with multiple virtual machines \\em without providing adequate hardware protection mechanisms; e.g., address-space separation and instruction execution control. This paper proposes a new trusted display service that has a minimal trusted code base and maintains full compatibility with commodity computing platforms. The service relies on a GPU separation kernel that (1) defines different types of GPU objects, (2) mediates access to security-sensitive objects, and (3) emulates object whenever required by commodity-platform compatibility. The separation kernel employs a new address-space separation mechanism that avoids the challenging problem of GPU instruction verification without adequate hardware support. The implementation of the trusted-display service has a code base that is two orders of magnitude smaller than other similar services, such as those based on full GPU virtualization. Performance measurements show that the trusted-display overhead added over and above that of the underlying trusted system is fairly modest.
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abstract = {A trusted display service assures the confidentiality and authenticity of content output by a security-sensitive application and thus prevents a compromised commodity operating system or application from surreptitiously reading or modifying the displayed output. Past approaches have failed to provide trusted display on commodity platforms that use modern graphics processing units (GPUs). For example, full GPU virtualization encourages the sharing of GPU address space with multiple virtual machines \\em without providing adequate hardware protection mechanisms; e.g., address-space separation and instruction execution control. This paper proposes a new trusted display service that has a minimal trusted code base and maintains full compatibility with commodity computing platforms. The service relies on a GPU separation kernel that (1) defines different types of GPU objects, (2) mediates access to security-sensitive objects, and (3) emulates object whenever required by commodity-platform compatibility. The separation kernel employs a new address-space separation mechanism that avoids the challenging problem of GPU instruction verification without adequate hardware support. The implementation of the trusted-display service has a code base that is two orders of magnitude smaller than other similar services, such as those based on full GPU virtualization. Performance measurements show that the trusted-display overhead added over and above that of the underlying trusted system is fairly modest.},
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author = {Yu, Miao and Gligor, Virgil D and Zhou, Zongwei},
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