SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks. Yu, H., Kaminsky, M., Gibbons, P. B., & Flaxman, A. 09/2006 2006. Paper doi abstract bibtex Peer-to-peer and other decentralized,distributed systems are known to be particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks. In a sybil attack,a malicious user obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be multiple, distinct nodes in the system. By controlling a large fraction of the nodes in the system,the malicious user is able to "out vote" the honest users in collaborative tasks such as Byzantine failure defenses. This paper presents SybilGuard, a novel protocol for limiting the corruptive influences of sybil attacks.Our protocol is based on the "social network "among user identities, where an edge between two identities indicates a human-established trust relationship. Malicious users can create many identities but few trust relationships. Thus, there is a disproportionately-small "cut" in the graph between the sybil nodes and the honest nodes. SybilGuard exploits this property to bound the number of identities a malicious user can create.We show the effectiveness of SybilGuard both analytically and experimentally.
@conference {Yu:2006:SDA:1159913.1159945,
title = {SybilGuard: defending against sybil attacks via social networks},
booktitle = {SIGCOMM{\textquoteright}06. Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communications},
series = {SIGCOMM {\textquoteright}06},
year = {2006},
month = {09/2006},
pages = {267{\textendash}278},
publisher = {ACM},
organization = {ACM},
address = {Pisa, Italy},
abstract = {Peer-to-peer and other decentralized,distributed systems are known to be particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks. In a sybil attack,a malicious user obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be multiple, distinct nodes in the system. By controlling a large fraction of the nodes in the system,the malicious user is able to "out vote" the honest users in collaborative tasks such as Byzantine failure defenses. This paper presents SybilGuard, a novel protocol for limiting the corruptive influences of sybil attacks.Our protocol is based on the "social network "among user identities, where an edge between two identities indicates a human-established trust relationship. Malicious users can create many identities but few trust relationships. Thus, there is a disproportionately-small "cut" in the graph between the sybil nodes and the honest nodes. SybilGuard exploits this property to bound the number of identities a malicious user can create.We show the effectiveness of SybilGuard both analytically and experimentally.},
keywords = {social networks, Sybil attack, sybilGuard},
isbn = {1-59593-308-5},
doi = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1159913.1159945},
url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1159913.1159945},
author = {Yu, Haifeng and Kaminsky, Michael and Gibbons, Phillip B. and Flaxman, Abraham}
}
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