When ignorance is bliss: The retailer's intelligence hazard under information sharing and exchanging. Zhang, C., Liu, B., Cai, G. G., & Huang, T. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2023. Publisher: Elsevier Ltd Type: Article![When ignorance is bliss: The retailer's intelligence hazard under information sharing and exchanging [link]](https://bibbase.org/img/filetypes/link.svg "link")
Paper doi abstract bibtex When a manufacturer possesses demand information, there is an opportunity for the retailer to infer the manufacturer's demand information based on the wholesale price. This paper explores the impact of such inference on the retailer's unilateral information sharing and bilateral information exchanging strategies in a supply chain with one retailer and two competing manufacturers. Two scenarios were studied under information sharing and exchanging schemes: an intelligent retailer who infers the manufacturers’ demand information from the wholesale prices and an unintelligent retailer who does not infer the information. Our analysis reveals that, regardless of whether the retailer infers or not, the retailer does not want to unilaterally share his information upward with the manufacturers. However, an unintelligent retailer is willing to exchange information with the manufacturers, and the inference does not fully undermine the retailer's incentives to exchange information. Furthermore, we find that, although the retailer's inference can help him cope with demand uncertainty, it can actually turn into a hazard (i.e., the retailer's intelligence hazard) under both information sharing scheme and information exchanging scheme; that is, being ignorant to the manufacturers’ demand information may be a bliss to everyone. We finally observe that side payment transfer may help eliminate the intelligence hazard under bilateral information exchanging but cannot resolve the intelligence hazard under unilateral information sharing. © 2023 Elsevier Ltd
@article{zhang_when_2023,
title = {When ignorance is bliss: {The} retailer's intelligence hazard under information sharing and exchanging},
volume = {180},
issn = {13665545},
url = {https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85177040267&doi=10.1016%2fj.tre.2023.103356&partnerID=40&md5=40594b998bc007aeb7dcdaf7ed1f0e74},
doi = {10.1016/j.tre.2023.103356},
abstract = {When a manufacturer possesses demand information, there is an opportunity for the retailer to infer the manufacturer's demand information based on the wholesale price. This paper explores the impact of such inference on the retailer's unilateral information sharing and bilateral information exchanging strategies in a supply chain with one retailer and two competing manufacturers. Two scenarios were studied under information sharing and exchanging schemes: an intelligent retailer who infers the manufacturers’ demand information from the wholesale prices and an unintelligent retailer who does not infer the information. Our analysis reveals that, regardless of whether the retailer infers or not, the retailer does not want to unilaterally share his information upward with the manufacturers. However, an unintelligent retailer is willing to exchange information with the manufacturers, and the inference does not fully undermine the retailer's incentives to exchange information. Furthermore, we find that, although the retailer's inference can help him cope with demand uncertainty, it can actually turn into a hazard (i.e., the retailer's intelligence hazard) under both information sharing scheme and information exchanging scheme; that is, being ignorant to the manufacturers’ demand information may be a bliss to everyone. We finally observe that side payment transfer may help eliminate the intelligence hazard under bilateral information exchanging but cannot resolve the intelligence hazard under unilateral information sharing. © 2023 Elsevier Ltd},
language = {English},
journal = {Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review},
author = {Zhang, Chu and Liu, Bin and Cai, Gangshu George and Huang, Tao},
year = {2023},
note = {Publisher: Elsevier Ltd
Type: Article},
keywords = {Costs, Demand information, Demand uncertainty, Hazards, Inference capability, Information analysis, Information dissemination, Information exchanging, Information sharing, Intelligence hazard, Sales, Sharing information, Sharing schemes, Supply chain competitions, Supply chain management, Whole sale prices, artificial intelligence, information processing, manufacturing, retailing, supply chain management},
}
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Two scenarios were studied under information sharing and exchanging schemes: an intelligent retailer who infers the manufacturers’ demand information from the wholesale prices and an unintelligent retailer who does not infer the information. Our analysis reveals that, regardless of whether the retailer infers or not, the retailer does not want to unilaterally share his information upward with the manufacturers. However, an unintelligent retailer is willing to exchange information with the manufacturers, and the inference does not fully undermine the retailer's incentives to exchange information. Furthermore, we find that, although the retailer's inference can help him cope with demand uncertainty, it can actually turn into a hazard (i.e., the retailer's intelligence hazard) under both information sharing scheme and information exchanging scheme; that is, being ignorant to the manufacturers’ demand information may be a bliss to everyone. 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