Progress as approximation to the truth: a defence of the verisimilitudinarian approach.
Cevolani, G.; and Tambolo, L.
Erkenntnis, 78(4): 921-935. 2013.
![Progress as approximation to the truth: a defence of the verisimilitudinarian approach [pdf]](//bibbase.org/img/filetypes/pdf.svg "Paper")
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@Article{gcBird,
Title = {Progress as approximation to the truth: a defence of the verisimilitudinarian approach},
Author = {Cevolani, G. and Tambolo, L.},
Journal = {Erkenntnis},
Number = {4},
Pages = {921-935},
Volume = {78},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {In this paper we provide a compact presentation of the verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress (VS, for short) and defend it against the sustained attack recently mounted by Alexander Bird (2007). Advocated by such authors as Ilkka Niiniluoto and Theo Kuipers, VS is the view that progress can be explained in terms of the increasing verisimilitude (or, equivalently, truthlikeness, or approximation to the truth) of scientific theories. According to Bird, VS overlooks the central issue of the appropriate grounding of scientific beliefs in the evidence, and it is therefore unable (a) to reconstruct in a satisfactory way some hypothetical cases of scientific progress, and (b) to provide an explanation of the aversion to falsity that characterizes scientific practice. We rebut both of these criticisms and argue that they reveal a misunderstanding of some key concepts underlying VS.},
Url = {PubsPDF/Cevolani & Tambolo 2013 - Progress as Approximation to the Truth.pdf},
Catalogato = {09.16.2011},
Doi = {10.1007/s10670-012-9362-y},
Owner = {Gustavo}
}
In this paper we provide a compact presentation of the verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress (VS, for short) and defend it against the sustained attack recently mounted by Alexander Bird (2007). Advocated by such authors as Ilkka Niiniluoto and Theo Kuipers, VS is the view that progress can be explained in terms of the increasing verisimilitude (or, equivalently, truthlikeness, or approximation to the truth) of scientific theories. According to Bird, VS overlooks the central issue of the appropriate grounding of scientific beliefs in the evidence, and it is therefore unable (a) to reconstruct in a satisfactory way some hypothetical cases of scientific progress, and (b) to provide an explanation of the aversion to falsity that characterizes scientific practice. We rebut both of these criticisms and argue that they reveal a misunderstanding of some key concepts underlying VS.
Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories.
Cevolani, G.; Festa, R.; and Kuipers, T. A. F.
Synthese, 190(16): 3307-3324. 2013.
Paper
doi
link
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abstract
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@Article{gcCFKSynthese,
Title = {Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories},
Author = {Cevolani, G. and Festa, R. and Kuipers, T. A. F.},
Journal = {Synthese},
Number = {16},
Pages = {3307-3324},
Volume = {190},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on "nomic conjunctive theories", i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impossibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative notion of the verisimilitude of such theories, and identify suitable conditions concerning the (partial) correctness of acquired data, under which revising our theories by data leads us closer to "the nomic truth", construed as the target of scientific inquiry. We conclude by indicating some further developments, generalizations, and open issues arising from our results.},
Url = {PubsPDF/Cevolani, Festa & Kuipers 2013 - Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories.pdf},
Catalogato = {30.48.2012},
Doi = {10.1007/s11229-012-0165-0},
Owner = {Gustavo}
}
In this paper, we address the problem of truth approximation through theory change, asking whether revising our theories by newly acquired data leads us closer to the truth about a given domain. More particularly, we focus on "nomic conjunctive theories", i.e., theories expressed as conjunctions of logically independent statements concerning the physical or, more generally, nomic possibilities and impossibilities of the domain under inquiry. We define both a comparative and a quantitative notion of the verisimilitude of such theories, and identify suitable conditions concerning the (partial) correctness of acquired data, under which revising our theories by data leads us closer to "the nomic truth", construed as the target of scientific inquiry. We conclude by indicating some further developments, generalizations, and open issues arising from our results.
Guest editor's preface.
Cevolani, G.
Ethics & Politics, 15(2): 7-13. 2013.
Special section on ``Cooperation in nature, science, and society''
Paper
link
bibtex
4 downloads
@Article{gcE&PCooperation,
Title = {Guest editor's preface},
Author = {Cevolani, G.},
Journal = {Ethics {\&} Politics},
Number = {2},
Pages = {7-13},
Volume = {15},
Year = {2013},
Note = {Special section on ``Cooperation in nature, science, and society''},
Url = {PubsPDF/Cevolani 2013 - Preface to E&P XV.2.pdf},
Catalogato = {23.59.2013},
Owner = {Gustavo}
}
Giochi di società. Teoria dei giochi e metodo delle scienze sociali.
Festa, R.; and Cevolani, G.
Mimesis, Milano-Udine, 2013.
Italian
link
bibtex
abstract
@Book{gcGiochiMimesis,
Title = {Giochi di societ\`a. Teoria dei giochi e metodo delle scienze sociali},
Author = {Festa, R. and Cevolani, G.},
Publisher = {Mimesis},
Year = {2013},
Address = {Milano-Udine},
Note = {Italian},
Abstract = {Nata verso la metà del secolo scorso, come teoria matematica delle interazioni strategiche tra agenti razionali, la teoria dei giochi ha progressivamente ampliato il proprio orizzonte. Infatti, a partire dalle originarie applicazioni in ambito economico, si è ramificata in diverse direzioni che vanno dalla biologia evoluzionistica alla strategia militare, dai problemi etico-politici a quelli logico-linguistici. Nel presente volume gli autori si occupano soprattutto dell’applicazione della teoria dei giochi nelle scienze sociali e dei problemi metodologici e, più in generale, filosofici che essa suscita. La loro ricerca è stata ispirata dalla convinzione che l'apparato concettuale delle teoria dei giochi è in grado di condurre a una progressiva unificazione di tutte le scienze sociali. Il presente volume offre un’introduzione ai principi fondamentali della teoria e una rassegna aggiornata dei suoi affascinanti sviluppi e applicazioni. Per il suo stile discorsivo e privo di formalismi matematici, può essere usato in qualsiasi facoltà universitaria, come manuale nei corsi di filosofia della scienza, epistemologia e metodologia delle scienze sociali. D’altra parte, il volume è destinato anche a tutti quei lettori che desiderano cominciare a esplorare la teoria dei giochi. Essi troveranno, fra l’altro, ampi riferimenti bibliografici che li aiuteranno a orientarsi nell'ormai vastissima letteratura e a proseguire l’esplorazione nelle direzioni più congeniali.},
Catalogato = {06.46.2013},
Owner = {Gustavo}
}
Nata verso la metà del secolo scorso, come teoria matematica delle interazioni strategiche tra agenti razionali, la teoria dei giochi ha progressivamente ampliato il proprio orizzonte. Infatti, a partire dalle originarie applicazioni in ambito economico, si è ramificata in diverse direzioni che vanno dalla biologia evoluzionistica alla strategia militare, dai problemi etico-politici a quelli logico-linguistici. Nel presente volume gli autori si occupano soprattutto dell’applicazione della teoria dei giochi nelle scienze sociali e dei problemi metodologici e, più in generale, filosofici che essa suscita. La loro ricerca è stata ispirata dalla convinzione che l'apparato concettuale delle teoria dei giochi è in grado di condurre a una progressiva unificazione di tutte le scienze sociali. Il presente volume offre un’introduzione ai principi fondamentali della teoria e una rassegna aggiornata dei suoi affascinanti sviluppi e applicazioni. Per il suo stile discorsivo e privo di formalismi matematici, può essere usato in qualsiasi facoltà universitaria, come manuale nei corsi di filosofia della scienza, epistemologia e metodologia delle scienze sociali. D’altra parte, il volume è destinato anche a tutti quei lettori che desiderano cominciare a esplorare la teoria dei giochi. Essi troveranno, fra l’altro, ampi riferimenti bibliografici che li aiuteranno a orientarsi nell'ormai vastissima letteratura e a proseguire l’esplorazione nelle direzioni più congeniali.
Truth may not explain predictive success, but truthlikeness does.
Cevolani, G.; and Tambolo, L.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44(4): 590-593. 2013.
Paper
doi
link
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abstract
5 downloads
@Article{gcHeld,
author = {G. Cevolani and L. Tambolo},
journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A},
title = {Truth may not explain predictive success, but truthlikeness does},
year = {2013},
number = {4},
pages = {590-593},
volume = {44},
abstract = {In a recent paper entitled "Truth does not explain predictive success" (Analysis, 2011), Carsten Held argues that the so-called No-Miracles Argument for scientific realism is easily refuted when the consequences of the underdetermination of theories by the evidence are taken into account. We contend that the No-Miracles Argument, when it is deployed within the context of sophisticated versions of realism, based on the notion of truthlikeness (or verisimilitude), survives Held's criticism unscathed.},
catalogato = {28.45.2013},
doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.05.004},
owner = {Gustavo},
url = {PubsPDF/Cevolani & Tambolo 2013 - Truth may not explain predictive success, but truthlikeness does.pdf},
}
In a recent paper entitled "Truth does not explain predictive success" (Analysis, 2011), Carsten Held argues that the so-called No-Miracles Argument for scientific realism is easily refuted when the consequences of the underdetermination of theories by the evidence are taken into account. We contend that the No-Miracles Argument, when it is deployed within the context of sophisticated versions of realism, based on the notion of truthlikeness (or verisimilitude), survives Held's criticism unscathed.
Truth approximation via abductive belief change.
Cevolani, G.
Logic Journal of the IGPL, 21(6): 999-1016. 2013.
Paper
doi
link
bibtex
abstract
4 downloads
@Article{gcMBR012paper,
Title = {Truth approximation via abductive belief change},
Author = {Cevolani, G.},
Journal = {Logic Journal of the IGPL},
Number = {6},
Pages = {999-1016},
Volume = {21},
Year = {2013},
Abstract = {We investigate the logical and conceptual connections between abductive reasoning construed as a process of belief change, on the one hand, and truth approximation, construed as increasing (estimated) verisimilitude, on the other. We introduce the notion of ‘(verisimilitude-guided) abductive belief change’ and discuss under what conditions abductively changing our theories or beliefs does lead them closer to the truth, and hence tracks truth approximation conceived as the main aim of inquiry. The consequences of our analysis for some recent discussions concerning belief revision aiming at truth approximation and inference to the best explanation are also highlighted.},
Url = {PubsPDF/Cevolani 2013 - Truth approximation via abductive belief change.pdf},
Doi = {10.1093/jigpal/jzt010}
}
We investigate the logical and conceptual connections between abductive reasoning construed as a process of belief change, on the one hand, and truth approximation, construed as increasing (estimated) verisimilitude, on the other. We introduce the notion of ‘(verisimilitude-guided) abductive belief change’ and discuss under what conditions abductively changing our theories or beliefs does lead them closer to the truth, and hence tracks truth approximation conceived as the main aim of inquiry. The consequences of our analysis for some recent discussions concerning belief revision aiming at truth approximation and inference to the best explanation are also highlighted.
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